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Shockwave: Lender Liability Under CERCLA
After United States v. Fleet Factors Corporation
INTRODUCTION
Industry pollutes. Consequently, as industry continues to develop,
so does the amount of hazardous wastes1 it generates. Today, the
United States is home to approximately 360,000 waste sites.2 To facil-
itate the cleanup of waste sites, Congress passed the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act3 (herein-
after "CERCLA") in 1980. CERCLA empowered the Environmental
Protection Agency (hereinafter the "EPA") to clean up inactive
waste sites and to recover cleanup costs from those responsible for
the waste. Persons delineated by CERCLA as potentially liable 4 par-
ties for cleanup costs are: 1) owners and operators of a polluted facil-
ity, 2) persons who have transported the waste, and 3) persons who
have contracted for the transportation of the waste. If a site is inac-
tive, however, the business responsible for the waste is often insol-
vent or bankrupt, and lacks the funds with which to reimburse the
EPA. When a business cannot pay, the government attempts to col-
lect its cleanup costs from other sources and often turns to the deep
pockets of banks which gave loans to the business secured by an in-
terest in the business facility. 5 CERCLA contains a "secured lender"
1. This Comment uses the terms hazardous "waste" and "substance" inter-
changeably. Both signify waste materials generated by industry as by-products. See
in;fra notes 25-26. For the statutory definition of hazardous substance in CERCLA, see
inkfra note 46.
2. Marcotte, Toxic Blackacre: Unprecedented Liability for Landowners, 73 A.B.A.
J. 66, 67 (Nov. 1987) (United States General Accounting Office estimate). See also
Comment, The Liability of Financial Institutions For Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs
Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 139-45.
3. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in part as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990)) [hereinafter CERCLA].
4. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
5. Banks have become hard hit by cleanup liability under CERCLA because the
government views their large assets and capital reserves as easy targets for recouping
cleanup costs. Alan Vollmann, an environmental attorney with the Washington D.C.
firm of Lane & Edison, stated in a Washington Post article that "[u]nder [CERCLA],
the government goes after the deep pockets first. And let's face it, lenders, we all
know you're the deep pocket." Swallow, Lenders Face New Risk in Toxic-Waste Ef-
forts; Law Gives EPA Broad Powers to Recoup Costs, Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1987, at El,
col. 4. For a discussion of the impact of high lender liability under CERCLA, see infra
notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
exemption which exempts from liability those persons "who, without
participating in the management of a facility, hold indicia of owner-
ship primarily to protect a security interest."6 The CERCLA secured
lender exemption is at the center of the environmental lender liabil-
ity controversy between the government and lending institutions.
Banks typically plead exemption from liability via the secured lender
exemption of CERCLA. The government usually argues that a bank
is liable for cleanup costs because it has either participated in the
management of the facility, or no longer holds indicia of ownership
to protect a security interest in the facility. Thus, the question is sim-
ple: when can a lender be held liable for cleanup costs under
CERCLA?
Whether a lender can be held liable under CERCLA will depend
on the interpretation of what constitutes sufficient "participation" in
management and what transforms a lender from a security holder
into an actual "owner" who can be held liable. The problem of
lender liability comes into sharp focus in two situations: when a
lender participates in the financial management of the facility in or-
der to protect the value of its security interest, and when a lender
holds title7 to the facility in order to guarantee the repayment of its
debt from a borrower.
Court interpretation of the secured lender exemption produced a
two-way splits between courts shielding lenders from liability and
those permitting liability to attach onto lenders. Recently, the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the case of United States v.
6. "Owners and operators" of a facility where wastes have been dumped are one
of the categories of persons liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA. CERCLA
§ 107(a)(1)-(2), (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(1)-(2) (West 1983 & Supp. 1989)). The
"secured lender exemption," as it is commonly referred to, removes persons who hold
a security interest in a facility from the statutory definition of "owners and operators,"
thus exempting them from liability. In order to be covered by the secured lender ex-
emption, a party: 1) must not have participated in the management of the facility, and
2) must hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest. CERCLA
§ 101(20)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990)).
7. "Holding title" is a generic term. Usually, lender liability problems arise when
a lender ("mortgagee") forecloses on a mortgage which secures the note by the bor-
rower ("mortgagor"). When the mortgagor defaults on his mortgage payments to the
mortgagee, the mortgagee forecloses on the mortgage. A foreclosure sale usually re-
sults in which the public can bid for title to the mortgaged property. Lenders gener-
ally bid at the foreclosure sale and often obtain title to the property. Whether or not a
lender may be liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA as an "owner" of a facility at
this point is one of the controversies surrounding CERCLA lender liability. See infra
notes 57-64 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of mortgages and real es-
tate transaction problems, see generally, B. DUNAWAY, THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL
ESTATE (6th ed. 1990).
8. The interpretation of the secured lender exemption is better characterized as a
split than as a trend. Although courts have progressively attached increasingly greater
liability to lenders, certain courts still find only narrow liability for lenders. See In re
Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). See infra notes 198-209 and accom-
panying text.
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Fleet Factors Corporation,9 ushering in unprecedented liability for
lenders. The court ruled that a lender could be held liable if it pos-
sessed the capacity to influence the waste dumping practices of the
borrower, regardless of whether such capacity was exercised.10 The
decision broke with all precedent on the issue of lender liability and
has sent waves of fear and uncertainty through the banking industry,
business, and government financial institutions.
Most affected by the decision are banks. Fleet Factors transforms
banks, many of which are in severe financial difficulty, into involun-
tary sureties for polluting businesses. Under Fleet Factors, banks, as
liable lenders, must foot the bill for businesses which have dumped
waste on their own premises.' As a result, many banks presently re-
fuse to lend money to businesses which pose even a slight risk of en-
vironmental liability.' 2 Certain banks, especially in rural areas, are
so small that a single environmental cleanup bill would wipe them
out.' 3 Other banks fear liability to such an extent that they have
written off outstanding debt and interest on active loans.14 For ex-
ample, one bank released a borrower from $558,000 of principal debt
and additional accrued interest because the bank feared potential en-
vironmental liability.' 5
Banks, however, are not the only sector of the economy adversely
affected by liability under Fleet Factors. Since many private lending
institutions are reluctant to make loans to businesses which utilize or
might potentially utilize hazardous substances, a restriction of avail-
able credit has resulted.16 Lenders still willing to loan money now
charge high up-front loan fees, points, and environmental assessment
fees which are often prohibitive to small businesses. The growth of
small businesses, the backbone of the American economy, may be se-
9. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d .1550, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 752
(1991).
10. Id. at 1560.
11. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text. Richard Miley, Esq., local coun-
sel for the Fleet Factors Corporation in Augusta, Georgia, states that the Fleet Factors
decision "guts the [CERCLA] secured lender exemption." Ruling May Widen Lender
Liability: Responsibility for Clean-Up May Grow, Bus. INS., June 4, 1990, at 1. Richard
Leland, Esq., counsel for the Fleet Factors Corporation at the trial court level, argues
that the Fleet Factors rule is "an attempt to make the banks, in effect, insurers." Id.
12. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
13. See A Lending Squeeze On Small Firms, NATION'S BUSINESS, May 1990, at 52.
14. Jaffe, Whose Mess is This?, FORBES, Feb. 19, 1990, at 43.
15. Id.
16. See Roberts, Sand in Economic Gears, Wash. Times, Sept. 6, 1990, at G1, col. 5.
See infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text.
verely restricted if Fleet Factors continues as viable precedent and
spreads to other federal circuits.
Government financial entities also might be potential victims of
the Fleet Factors decision.17 Certain government entities hold fore-
closed "savings and loan" properties for liquidation, some of which
require environmental cleanup. The cleanup cost for these proper-
ties would amount to over one billion dollars for the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (hereinafter the "FDIC") alone. These gov-
ernment organizations already face great difficulties in light of pres-
ent recessionary woes and the expected failure of some thirty-five
banks in the near future. Their difficulties would dramatically in-
crease under Fleet Factors.
While it is true that the maintenance of a healthy environment is
important to society as a whole, it seems unfair for banks to bear the
exorbitant costs of cleanup when banks are not at fault. Conversely,
it seems equally unfair for taxpayers, via the EPA and its Superfund,
to foot the bill for businesses which pollute and are the cause of high
cleanup costs on a national level.' 8
The increased tendency of courts to place liability for cleanup costs
onto lenders has sent shock waves not only through the private and
public finance communities, but also through the EPA and Congress.
As a direct reaction to Fleet Factors, the EPA has drafted an adminis-
trative rule which would indemnify both private and public lenders
from CERCLA liability.19 With the same goal in mind, both houses
of Congress have scrambled to introduce legislation which would par-
tially indemnify lenders from CERCLA cleanup liability.20 Even
though passage of lender indemnification legislation may be likely,21
it will only lay to rest the problem of lender liability itself. The
17. Financial Institutions: FDIC, RTC Want More CERCLA Protection in Senate
Bill Limiting CERCLA Exposure, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 140, at A-22
(July 20, 1990).
18. Cleanup costs have soared within the past few years. Craig Gass, a KPMG
Peat Marwick expert on environmental financial management in New York, estimates
that environmental cleanup costs could reach $500 billion within the next 50 years.
See Jaffe, supra note 15, at 43.
19. EPA Lender Liability under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R., reprinted in 21 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) No. 24, 1162 (Oct. 12, 1990) (to be formally codified upon review of comments).
20. The legislation in the House of Representatives was introduced before Fleet
Factors, after the decision in United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp.
573 (D. Md. 1986). The desire to indemnify lenders against CERCLA liability has be-
come even more intense once Fleet Factors dramatically increased the scope of liability
for lenders.
21. Passage of lender indemnification legislation in the House of Representatives
is more likely than in the Senate. H.R. 4494 has received 290 cosponsors out of a possi-
ble 435 House Members. S. 2827 has received only one cosponsor, Senator Nancy Kas-
sebaum (R-KS). Telephone interview with staff member of the Senate Republican
Policy Committee (Nov. 21, 1990). See infra notes 258-72 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18: 513, 1991] Lender Liability Under CERCLA
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
larger problem of fault apportionment will not be solved merely by
indemnifying lenders.
The goal of this Comment is to examine the impact of the the Fleet
Factors decision. Part II of this Comment provides the necessary
overview of CERCLA, examining the imposition of cleanup liability
on parties delineated by CERCLA. Part III details the development
of the judicial bases for the lender liability split that developed since
CERCLA's passage in 1980. Part IV of this Comment explains the
facts, reasoning, and rule of the Eleventh Circuit's Fleet Factors deci-
sion. Part V explores the impact of Fleet Factors' broad lender liabil-
ity rule on banks, businesses, government financial institutions, and
on the environment. Part VI discusses both the EPA's and the fed-
eral judiciary's reactions to the Fleet Factors rule. Part VII of this
Comment examines attempts by both the House of Representatives
and the Senate to partially indemnify lenders from CERCLA liabil-
ity. The author offers his conclusions in Part VIII.
II. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act 22 ("CERCLA") authorizes the United States to collect
cleanup costs from parties responsible for the dumping of hazardous
waste. Since lender liability for environmental cleanup costs finds its
basis in CERCLA, it is essential to examine the Act and its liability
provisions.
A. General Background
Hazardous wastes were born out of the development of synthetic
products during the post-World War II expansion of American indus-
try.23 The modernization of chemical technology coupled with the in-
crease in industrial production have generated an immense variety of
new chemicals. 24 Many of these chemicals are lethal and must be
22. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in part as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990)).
23. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 14
(1988).
24. Over 70,000 organic chemicals are on the market today, with 10,000 new chemi-
cals added each year. B. NEBEL, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 316 (1981). The two most
common industrial by-products are chlorinated hydrocarbons and heavy metals. I& at
318-20 (table 7-1 listing common pollutants, their sources, and side effects).
stored with utmost care in order to avoid "leaching" 25 into ground-
water supplies, rakes and rivers. Certain wastes are radioactive and
thus remain harmful for thousands of years.26
Out of sight and out of mind for over three decades, hazardous
wastes began to rally massive public attention in 1978 with the Love
Canal disaster.27 Thousands of drums filled with toxic chlorinated
hydrocarbons were deposited in an abandoned canal bed in the Love
Canal area near Niagara Falls, New York.28 The canal bed was sub-
sequently filled, and residential homes were built along the banks of
the canal. In 1978, residents noticed a high incidence of health
problems, including birth defects, miscarriages, and liver disease.
Residents also noticed that black liquids would ooze out of the
ground after periods of rainfall. Health officials were contacted and
discovered the chemical waste drums underground.29 As a response
to the public outrage which ensued and the genuine need to imple-
25. Historically, industrial by-products such as ethylene, sulfur-dioxide and carbon
monoxide were present in nature and could be assimilated by the environment. How-
ever, many of today's industrial by-products do not occur naturally and cannot be as-
similated by the environment. See B. NEBEL, supra note 24, at 316. These by-products
pose a threat to the health of the population by leaching into groundwater supplies.
Leaching is a phenomenon by which chemical ions in the ground are carried off by
rainfall. Since rainwater eventually ends up in groundwater supplies from which peo-
ple obtain water, the process of leaching often pollutes water supplies near waste sites.
See id at 165, 238.
The environment has a way of healing itself, and chemicals dumped into the envi-
ronment are often diluted. Sometimes, however, the reverse occurs, and chemicals re-
appear in organisms at higher levels of concentration. This is defined as
"bioaccumulation" or "biomagnification." One example of biomagnification occurred
when the pesticide Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane or "DDT" was used in increas-
ingly higher doses during the 1960's. Scientists believed that DDT would be diluted in
the environment. To the contrary, the biomagnification of DDT in certain animals
caused severe reproductive failures and deaths, especially in birds which consumed
contaminated insects. The biomagnification of DDT was blamed for the near extinc-
tion of the American bald eagle. Biomagnification can also have very harmful effects
on individuals consuming organisms found near sites and facilities where wastes are
dumped. See id. at 342-43.
26. Approximately two-thirds of the uranium-235 supply in nuclear power fuel
pellets undergoes nuclear fission within one year. The remaining one-third, as well as
the waste from the fissioned uranium, can no longer undergo fission and generates
heat to make steam for the nuclear power turbines. Two problems result from- these
wastes. First, these radioactive wastes emit subatomic particles which harm human
beings over relatively short periods of exposure. The second problem is that their radi-
oactivity disappears very slowly, according to their individual "half-lives." A half-life
is the length of time necessary for half of the radioactive atoms to decay (in mathemat-
ical terms, the decaying process progresses in a reverse logarithmic scale). The half-
lives of radioactive materials can be extremely long. A common isotope obtained from
uranium fission is plutonium-239. Plutonium's half-life of 24,000 years means that it
must be kept out of contact with the population, the food chain, and water reserves for
approximately 200,000 years before it becomes relatively harmless. See B. NEBEL,
supra note 24, at 576-78.
27. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 14.
28. B. NEBEL, supra note 24, at 346.
29. Id.
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ment more effective rules to clean up waste sites, Congress passed
CERCLA in 1980.30
Although various cleanup and compensation laws already existed
at the time CERCLA was passed, these did not provide the blanket
coverage necessary to properly protect the environment from modern
waste threats.31 CERCLA required the cleanup of hazardous sub-
stances on inactive sites and empowered the EPA to expend funds to
effectuate cleanups and to later recover cleanup costs from those re-
sponsible for the dumping.32 To make funds readily available to the
EPA for its cleanup efforts, CERCLA established the Hazardous
Substance Response Trust Fund,33  better known as the
"Superfund." 34 The Superfund derives revenue from two sources:
excise taxes from industry and funds recovered by the EPA as reim-
bursement for cleanup costs. 35
CERCLA was hastily drafted during the last days of the second
session of the 96th Congress, in the last month of the Carter Presi-
dency. 36 Because of the rushed drafting and the tremendous political
compromise which went into the passage of CERCLA, little legisla-
tive history exists to shed light on the intent of Congress as to spe-
cific CERCLA provisions. Congress, perhaps intentionally, failed to
30. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 14.
31. The environmental laws which were in existence before CERCLA was enacted
had gaps between them and also overlapped each other. In the words of one group of
commentators, CERCLA was passed in order to "make sense of various redundant and
inadequate cleanup and compensation laws." F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A.
TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLIcY 568 (1984).
32. CERCLA §§ 103-104, (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9603-9604 (West 1983 & Supp.
1989)).
33. CERCLA §§ 131-133, (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9631-9633 (West 1983 & Supp.
1986)), as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Authorization Act of 1986
("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-
9675 (West Supp. 1989)).
34. The concept of a "Superfund" was originally crafted by the large oil companies
in order to fund the cleanup of spills from oil tankers. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
supra note 23, at 14-15. In exchange for financing the fund, the oil companies wished
to be released from cleanup liability. Id. This original "Superfund," however, never
came into existence. Instead, the Superfund, as created by CERCLA, was first
designed to fund the cleanup of Love Canal in the late 1970's. Id,
35. The Superfund was established by Section 9507 of the Internal Revenue Code,
26 I.R.C. § 9507 (1986). The initial Superfund of 1980 was funded by excise taxes im-
posed on chemical feedstocks, as well as on crude oil delivered to a refinery or im-
ported into the United States. CERCLA § 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9631 (West
1983)) (repealed by Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1774 (1986)). See BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, supra note 23, at 14, 20.
36. Presumably, Congress feared that then President-elect Ronald Reagan would
not sign CERCLA if it were passed during his administration because of his strong
pro-business stance.
state the standard of liability which should be applied under
CERCLA. Courts quickly remedied this omission, however, and de-
termined that strict liability would be the standard under CERCLA,
with joint and several liability for indivisible harm.3 7
Because of the administrative controversies3 8 and the overall
dearth of performed cleanups, many members of Congress believed
that although great powers had been bestowed upon the EPA by
CERCLA, the Agency had made miserly use of its granted abilities.
In an attempt to increase the number of cleanups performed, Con-
gress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorizations Act3 9
(hereinafter "SARA") in 1986. Designed to increase the efficiency of
CERCLA, SARA made certain important modifications to CERCLA.
For example, SARA increased the Superfund coffer to $8.5 billion by
1991 and set schedules for cleanup.40 SARA also encouraged poten-
tially liable parties to settle with the EPA by protecting those who
settled both from contribution claims by nonsettling parties as well
as from government suits via a "covenant not to sue" clause.41 Fur-
ther, SARA limited the liability of state and local governments for
cleanup costs by excluding state and local governments from cleanup
liability if they acquired ownership or control involuntarily.42 A unit
of state or local government, however, would remain liable if it
caused the release of the hazardous substance.43 Presumably because
37. Strict liability applies to each of the four categories of persons liable under
CERCLA. Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572
(5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 n.11 (4th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989). Each of the four categories of persons liable under
CERCLA is also held jointly and severally liable. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d at 171;
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
38. In 1983, the Congress charged EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford and
other high level EPA administrators with mismanagement of funds and conflicts of in-
terest. Congressional Democrats asserted that the EPA's administrative problems
were caused by a lack of concern from the Reagan Administration. BUREAU OF NA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAws (1988). The EPA administrative contro-
versies were heightened by the discovery of dioxin at Times Beach, Missouri which
caused the relocation of 2,400 families and a government buy-out of the town. Id. As a
result of these problems, over 20 high-level EPA managers were fired or resigned. Id.
EPA Administrator Anne Burford was succeeded by William D. Ruckelshaus, who ac-
celerated the cleanup of hazardous wastes. Id.
39. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675
(West Supp. 1989)).
40. Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613. After
SARA, an additional source of funding for the Superfund was imposed, namely, an en-
vironmental tax on corporations with annual incomes greater than $2 million. 17
ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 26, 955 (Oct. 24, 1986).
41. CERCLA § 122, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622 (West Supp. 1989)).
42. The section reads: "The term 'owner or operator' does not include a unit or
State or local government which acquired ownership or control involuntarily through
bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the gov-
ernment involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign." CERCLA
§ 101(20)(A) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(D) (West Supp. 1990)).
43. The section reads:
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Congress approved of the liability scheme imposed by the courts
upon CERCLA, SARA modified neither the strict liability nor joint
and several liability schemes.
B. Liability Under CERCLA
The aim of CERCLA was to hold liable those persons who are "re-
sponsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison."44
Before liability may lie under CERCLA, however, the government
must first show that there has been an actual or threatened "re-
lease"45 of a "hazardous substance"46 at a "facility."4 7 Once these
The exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not apply to any State or
local government which has caused or contributed to the release or
threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility, and such a State
or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this Chapter in the
same manner and to the same extent, bath procedurally and substantively, as
any nongovernmental entity, including liability under Section 9607 of this
title.
CERCLA § 101(20)(D) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(D) (West Supp.
1990)).
44. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (quoting Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 1990) cert
denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991)).
45. CERCLA defines a "release" as follows:
'[R]elease' means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying,
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the envi-
ronment (including the abandonment or discarding of bands, containers, and
other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to per-
sons solely within a workplace, with respect to a claim which such persons
may assert against the employer of such persons, (B) emissions from the en-
gine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline
pumping station engine, (C) release of source, by-product, or special nuclear
material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, if such release is subject to requirements with respect to
financial protection established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under
section 170 of such Act or, for the purposes of section 9604 of this title or any
other response action, any release of source by-product, or special nuclear ma-
terial from any processing site designated under section 7912(a)(1) or 7942(a)
of this title, and (D) the normal application of fertilizer.
CERCLA § 101(22) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(22) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990)).
46. CERCLA does not itself define a "hazardous substance," but rather gives the
term meaning through its definition in other environmental statutes. The Act reads:
The term 'hazardous substance' means (A) any substance designated pursuant
to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, so-
lution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any
hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant
to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (but not including any waste
the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal Act has been sus-
pended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section
1317(a), (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean
Air Act. The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil of any frac-
threshold facts have been established, four categories of persons may
be held liable for cleanup costs: 4 8 1) the owner and operator of a fa-
cility,49 2) any person who owned or operated a facility when the dis-
posal of hazardous waste occurred, 3) a person who arranged for
transport for disposal or treatment, and 4) a person who accepted
hazardous substances for transport to the facility from which a re-
lease has occurred or is threatened. Liability for those who fit into
one of these four categories will be strict, joint and several.50 Those
tion thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated ,as a haz-
ardous substance under the subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph,
and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natu-
ral gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such
synthetic gas).
CERCLA § 101(14) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990)).
47. Defined by CERCLA:
'[F]acility' means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or
pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works),
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor
vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come
to be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer use or
any vessel.
CERCLA § 101(9) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(9) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990)).
48. CERCLA delineates the four categories of persons liable for environmental
cleanup costs as follows:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substances owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for dispo-
sal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or
treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any
other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated
by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence
of response costs, of a hazardous substance ....
CERCLA § 107(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990)).
49. An understanding of the statutory definition of "owners and operators" is cru-
cial to the lender liability issue because lenders are generally sued for the recovery of
cleanup costs as "owners and operators." The definition of "owners and operators" is
additionally important because it contains the secured lender exemption (italicized be-
low). The definition reads:
The term "owner or operator" means (1) in the case of a vessel, any person
owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of any
onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such
facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was con-
veyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or simi-
lar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned,
operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately be-
forehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in
the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
CERCLA § 101(20)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983 & Supp.
1990)) (emphasis added).
50. See supra note 39.
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held to be liable are responsible for: 1) cleanup costs incurred by the
United States, 2) damages for injury to the environment, and 3) all
other necessary response costs.51
The source of lender liability under CERCLA comes from the first
two categories of persons liable: 1) "owners or operators" of a facility,
and 2) "owners or operators" of a facility at the time that dumping
occurred.5 2 Lenders can avoid liability by either falling into the "se-
cured lender" exemption to the statutory definition of "owners or op-
erators," or by asserting one of three statutory defenses listed in
CERCLA.53 The secured lender exemption states that liability as an
owner or operator does not include one "who, without participating
in the management of a . .. facility, holds indicia of ownership pri-
marily to protect his security interest in the... facility."54 CERCLA
provides a complete defense to liability if a defendant can establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that the release and its damages
were: 1) caused by an act of God, or 2) caused by an act of war, or 3)
caused by an act or failure to act on the part of a third party who is
neither an employee nor an agent of the defendant.55 This third de-
51. Liability under CERCLA will be primarily for cleanup costs incurred by the
government, but can also be for other costs as well. CERCLA provides that parties
shall be liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Gov-
ernment or a State or an Indian Tribe not inconsistent with the national con-
tingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person con-
sistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, includ-
ing the reasonable costs of asserting such injury, destruction, or loss resulting
from such a release.
CERCLA § 107(a)(4) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990)).
52. Clyde Mitchell, Esq., a partner at White & Case who specializes in banking
and financial law, states that the primary CERCLA categories under which lenders
are held liable are "owners and operators" of a facility, and "owners or operators" of a
facility when dumping occurs. Mitchell, Liability Under CERCLA for Indenture Trust-
ees, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 1990, at 3.
53. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
54. CERCLA § 101(20)(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(a) (West
1983 & Supp. 1990)). For the text of the statutory definition of "owner and operator,"
see supra note 49.
55. The three statutory defenses to' liability provided by CERCLA are as follows:
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a con-
tractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (ex-
cept where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff
and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant es-
tablishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care
fense is commonly referred to as the "third party" defense. To fulfill
the "third party" defense, a defendant must show: (1) that a third
party caused the release, (2) that the defendant exercised due care,
and (3) that the defendant took precautions against third parties'
foreseeable acts or failures to act.5
When the government attempts to hold a lender liable for cleanup
costs under CERCLA, the lender will commonly argue that it is ex-
empt from liability because it falls into the "secured lender" exemp-
tion. The lender will argue that since it is one "who, without
participating in the management of a facility, holds indicia of owner-
ship primarily to protect [its] security interest," it is excepted from
the definition of "owners and operators" and therefore from liability
as well.57 The government will argue that the lender is liable be-
cause it either became an "owner" while holding the property as se-
curity, or because it "participated" in the management of the
facility.58 Thus, the determination of whether or not a lender is lia-
ble under CERCLA centers upon the interpretation of the "secured
lender" exemption.
Since a lender may be removed from the "secured lender" exemp-
tion by either "participation" in the management of a facility, or by
the absence of indicia of ownership "to protect a security interest,"
the interpretation of what constitutes sufficient "participation" and
"protection of a security interest" is the key to lender liability. De-
pending upon whether the interpretation of these elements is narrow
or broad, lenders will be held more or less liable, respectively. Cer-
tain courts have accorded only narrow protection to lenders in the
with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration
the characteristics of such a hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts
and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably
result from such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
CERCLA § 107(b) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West 1983 & Supp.
1990)).
56. See supra note 55 at (3).
57. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
58. It is important to understand the procedural workings of the secured lender
exemption. Four categories of persons are liable under CERCLA. The first two cate-
gories of persons are liable as "owners and operators" of the facility. CERCLA, how-
ever, excepts from the definition of "owners and operators" those who hold indicia of
ownership to the facility if and only if 1) they have not participated in the manage-
ment of the facility, and 2) they hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect a secur-
ity interest. Therefore, a lender might argue that he falls under the secured lender
exemption, but if he has either participated in the management of the facility, or if he
holds indicia of ownership for reasons other than to protect a security interest, he will
be considered an "owner and operator" and will be held liable for cleanup costs. Con-
ceptually, this operates as an exemption to an exemption. See CERCLA § 101(20)(A)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990)); and
supra note 48.
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exemption.5 9
III. PAST INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CERCLA SECURED LENDER
EXEMPTION
Among the lower federal district courts the different interpreta-
tions of the secured lender exemption to "owners or operators" have
crystallized into a split based on two cases: United States v.
Mirabile6O and United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Company.61
There are few existing cases in each branch of the dichotomy because
relatively little time has elapsed since CERCLA's enactment. The
Fleet Factors ruling is the first federal circuit court interpretation of
the secured lender exemption to CERCLA liability. In order to un-
derstand the powerful significance of the novel Fleet Factors rule, it
is essential to examine the two lines of judicial interpretation of the
secured lender exemption presented by Mirabile and Maryland
Bank.
A. The United States v. Mirabile Line of Cases
The secured lender exemption in CERCLA removes lenders from
the "owners or operators" category of persons liable under CERCLA.
However, if a lender "participates" in management or no longer
holds property "to protect his security interest," then the lender will
no longer be protected by the secured lender exemption and will face
liability. In United States v. Mirabile, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the purchase
and resale of secured property by a lender is necessary to protect a
lender's security interest and will not in itself make a lender liable.6 2
The court also held that the participation of a lender in the purely
financial management of a facility is insufficient to make the lender
liable.63 The court ruled that the only "participation" which will re-
move the secured lender exemption is operational or "day to day"
management of the facility.64
59. See supra note 8.
60. United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
61. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).




1. The Facts of Mirabile
The facts of Mirabile involved Turco Coatings, Incorporated (here-
inafter "Turco"), a company which owned and operated a paint man-
ufacturing plant.65 American Bank and Trust Company (hereinafter
"American Bank") financed Turco and held a security interest in the
Turco manufacturing site.6 6 Turco petitioned for bankruptcy, but the
petition was denied. American Bank foreclosed on the Turco manu-
facturing site and was the highest bidder at the sheriff's sale on Au-
gust 21, 1981.67 Before American Bank took title to the site, it
assigned its high bid to Anna and Thomas Mirabile on December 15,
1981. The Mirabiles took title to the site via a sheriff's deed.68 Prior
to the assignment of the bid, American Bank boarded up the win-
dows on the site, changed the locks, inquired as to the price of
cleanup for the chemical drums on the site, and showed the site to
potential purchasers. 69 The United States determined that cleanup
of the site was required and proceeded to clean the site of hazardous
substances.70 The United States then brought suit against the
Mirabiles under CERCLA to recover the cleanup costs it had in-
curred.71 The Mirabiles in turn sued American Bank, alleging that
American Bank was liable for the cleanup costs.72 American filed a
summary judgment motion against the Mirabiles, asserting that
American Bank was covered by the CERCLA secured lender exemp-
tion and therefore not liable.73
2. The Reasoning and Holding of Mirabile
The federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
found that American Bank was not liable for the cleanup costs in-
curred by the United States and granted American Bank's summary
judgment motion.74 The court initially determined that the main is-
sue was one of degree of management, not of ownership.75 The court
reasoned that regardless of whether American Bank had received
65. Id. at 2.
66. Turco was also financed by the Small Business Administration ("SBA") and
Mellon Bank. Id. Since only American Bank foreclosed on the facility, however, only
American Bank's summary judgment motion is of relevance to the narrow liability in-
terpretation of the secured lender exemption by the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. Id,
67. Id. at 4. A sheriff's sale is essentially a foreclosure sale conducted by a sheriff.
See generally G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
68. Mirabile, slip. op. at 4.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id. at 1.
71. Id
72. Id at 2.
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id. at 6.
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legal title when it successfully bid at the sheriff's sale, its foreclosure
efforts were undertaken to preserve its security interest, which
brought American Bank within the secured lender exception to
"owners or operators."76 The court reasoned that the reference to
the management of a "facility" in the security interest exception to
"owners and operators" was critical, because it referred to the opera-
tional management of the facility rather than the purely financial
management of the business.77 With regard to this distinction, the
court placed great stock in the intent of Congress, giving weight to a
House Report which defined "operator" as one who carries out the
operational functions of a facility.78 The court reasoned that Con-
gress had singled out secured lenders as an exception to liability, and
intended to attach liability upon parties which are "responsible" and
which "have profited from improper disposal practices." 79 The court
interpreted such intent to signify that a secured lender must under-
take day to day operational management of the facility in order to be
liableSO Although the court noted that imposing liability upon banks
might be a favorable policy because such liability would allow the
government to recover its cleanup costs, the court refused to create
such a policy and explicitly left the question to the policy-making
power of the Congress.S1
In sum, the court in Mirabile held that the purchase of a property
at foreclosure by a lender and its subsequent resale is insufficient to
hold a lender liable under CERCLA. The court also held that pure
financial participation in the management of a facility does not con-
stitute sufficient "participation" to remove a lender from the secured
lender exemption of CERCLA.
B. The United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Company Line of
Cases.
Whereas the court in Mirabile cautiously backed away from impos-
ing broad liability upon lenders because it believed such a policy deci-
sion should properly be decided by the Congress, the United States
District Court of Maryland in United States v. Maryland Bank &
76. Id.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 35 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6160, 6180).
79. Id. at 6.
80. Id.
81. Id.
Trust Company8 2 opted for the reverse, deciding to implement a
broad lender liability policy.8 3 In Maryland Bank, the federal district
court ruled that the secured lender exception to "owners and opera-
tors" applies only if a lender holds the property as security at the
time of the cleanup.8 4 Thus, when a lender forecloses upon a prop-
erty and obtains title to it by purchasing the property at the foreclo-
sure sale, the lender no longer holds a security interest in the
property but rather becomes a full-fledged owner and, as such, is lia-
ble under the "owners and operators" category of CERCLA.85
1. The Facts of Maryland Bank
In Maryland Bank, the McLeods owned a 117 acre farm in the
State of Maryland. The Maryland Bank and Trust Company (herein-
after "Maryland Bank") loaned money to the McLeods for two waste
disposal businesses.8 6 The McLeods dumped hazardous wastes on the
property.8 7 Although Maryland Bank knew the McLeods were
dumping garbage, it was not clear whether it knew that the McLeods
were dumping hazardous wastes. 88
Later, the McLeods' son, Mark McLeod, obtained a loan from
Maryland Bank in order to purchase the farm from his parents. The
loan was secured by the farm. Soon after purchase, Mark McLeod
defaulted on his payments to Maryland Bank and the bank fore-
closed. Maryland Bank purchased the property at the foreclosure
sale and obtained title to the farm.89 Mark McLeod informed the
82. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
83. Id. at 580. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
84. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
85. Id. The court argued that Congress created the secured lender exemption for
application only in title theory states, where mortgagees (lenders) are in actual posses-
sion of title during the life of the mortgage. Id, In title theory states, title is surren-
dered to the mortgagor (borrower) only when the mortgage debt has been fulfilled.
The court determined that the secured lender exemption does not bar liability for
lenders who, as in lien theory states, do not have possession of title during the life of
the mortgage, and only acquire title after purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale.
Id. Presumably, the court would also bar the application of the secured lender exemp-
tion in intermediate theory states, where the mortgagor has possession of title until
default, at which time title is automatically transferred to the mortgagee. It does not
seem logical, however, that Congress would draft a provision in such a broad and im-
portant Act as CERCLA which would include only a small minority of states which
still operate under the common law fiction of title theory. For a detailed explanation
of mortgage procedure in title, intermediate, and lien theory states, see Kratovil, Mort-
gages-Problems in Possession, Rents, and Mortgagee Liability, 11 DE PAUL L. REV. 1
(1961).
86. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 575.
87. Id. The McLeods dumped organic chemicals and heavy metals on the site.
Among the organic chemicals dumped were toluene, ethylbenzene, and total xylenes.
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County Department of Health that hazardous substances were pres-
ent on the farm, whereupon the EPA was duly notified and effectu-
ated a cleanup of the facility, later billing Maryland Bank for the
cleanup costs.9 0 When Maryland Bank refused to pay, the EPA
brought suit against the bank under CERCLA.91
2. The Reasoning and Holding of Maryland Bank
The court found that Maryland Bank was liable for the cleanup
costs incurred by the EPA.92 The court first analyzed the language
of the "owners and operators" provision and determined that the per-
sons covered by "owners and operators" were either owners or opera-
tors, reasoning that the definitions are mutually exclusive.9 3 Since
one could not be an operator and an owner simultaneously, the court
determined that liability could attach to one who is either an owner
or an operator.94 Such a determination by the court opened the door
to liability for Maryland Bank since the bank was definitely not an
operator of the site, but could be construed as having been an owner
by virtue of the foreclosure sale.
The court proceeded to examine the secured lender exemption
which excludes a person who "holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest. . . ."95 The court gave critical weight
to the tense of the verb "to hold" reasoning that, since the verb is in
the present tense (i.e., holds) rather than in the past tense (i.e., held),
Congress intended the secured lender exemption to attach only if the
lender holds a security interest at the time of cleanup.9 6 Applying
90. Id. The EPA removed 237 drums of chemicals and 1180 tons of contaminated
soil from the site. Id, at 575-76. The total cost of the cleanup was $551,713.50. Id. at
576.
91. Id. at 576.
92. Id. at 582.
93. Id. at 578.
94. Id. The court relied on a House Report which defined an "operator" of a facil-
ity as "a person who is carrying out operational functions for the owner of the facil-
ity .. " H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 37 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6160, 6182. The court reasoned that an operator and
an owner must, by definition, be two distinct parties. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at
578. The court in Mirabile reasoned along the same lines. See supra note 85 and ac-
companying text.
95. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 577 (emphasis deleted) (quoting CERCLA
§ 101(20)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A) (West 1983))).
96. Id. at 579. The court seems hypocritical in assigning weight to various terms.
The court apparently attempted to make the statutory language of CERCLA meet its
own policy goals of broad lender liability rather than allow the statutory language to
determine the breadth of liability. When deciding that "owners and operators" in fact
signified "owners or operators," the court stated that "to slavishly follow the laws of
this rationale, the court concluded that once a security interest
holder forecloses upon the security and purchases it at the foreclo-
sure sale, the lender becomes the veritable owner thereby losing the
protection of the secured lender exemption.97 Determining that
Maryland Bank did not have merely a security interest but was, in
fact, the owner at the time of cleanup, the court held Maryland Bank
liable for the cleanup costs. 98
The court also rationalized the liability of Maryland Bank on policy
grounds, asserting that broad indemnity for lenders would create a
windfall for mortgagees. 99 The court noted that banks which had ac-
quired waste-encumbered property at a low foreclosure sale price
could rely on the government, via the EPA, to incur all the cleanup
costs. 100 Once the property had been cleaned at government expense,
it would have greater market value than it had at the time of foreclo-
sure. Banks could then sell the property at a higher price and reap a
"windfall" at the expense of the government.' 0 ' The court specu-
lated that banks, unlike the government, could protect themselves
against environmental liability by making "prudent loans" and by in-
vestigating the environmental conditions of properties they hold in
security before problems arise. 10 2
Although the court held Maryland Bank liable as an "owner" of
the foreclosed site, it proposed that the third party defense to owners
and operators "might still be available to Maryland Bank if it could
show it had exercised 'due care.' "o3 The court did not rule on the
defense, however, because such a determination would have exceeded
the court's jurisdiction in the summary judgment proceeding.104
In sum, the court in Maryland Bank held that once a lender fore-
grammar while interpreting acts of Congress would violate sound canons of statutory
interpretation." Id. at 578 (quoting Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713-14 (1975)).
On the other hand, when the court determined that a lender is only exempt from lia-
bility when it holds a security interest at the time of cleanup, the court placed im-
mense importance on the statutory tense of the verb "to hold." The court asserted:
"The verb tense of the exclusionary language is critical." Id. at 579.
97. Id. at 579.
98. Id. at 582.
99. Id. at 580.
100. Id.
101. Id. The problem of a "government windfall" would be disposed of effectively
by passage of present Senate legislation and the final review of a current EPA admin-
istrative rule. Both would make a lender liable for the increase in value of a property
after cleanup by the government. See infra notes 217-19 and 281 and accompanying
text.
102. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
103. Id. at 581.
104. Id. at 581-82. A ruling on the defense would require a determination of factual
issues. The court was proceeding on the United States' motion for summary judgment,
a motion in which a court may decide purely legal issues. Id.
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closes on a property and obtains title at the foreclosure sale, it be-
comes an "owner" and is subject to liability under CERCLA.
IV. UNITED STATES V. FLEET FACToRs
Whereas some courts have opted for the prudent, narrow lender li-
ability approach of Mirabile, other courts follow the policy-active,
broad liability rule initiated by Maryland Bank.O5 In both lines of
cases, however, a lender must be either an "owner" of the facility, or
must have exercised a high level of participation in facility manage-
ment to be liable for cleanup costs. The court in Fleet Factors, how-
ever, rejected not only the caution of Mirabile, it went beyond even
the holding in Maryland Bank. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in United States v. Fleet Factors Corporation0 6 held that a
lender is liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA where it merely
had the capacity to influence the borrower's dumping practices, 0 7
even where the lender did not participate in the day-to-day manage-
ment of the facility.108 Under the Fleet Factors rule, it is immaterial
whether the lender exercised the capacity.
The Fleet Factors ruling is even more potent because it was the
first time a circuit court interpreted the secured lender exemption of
CERCLA.109 Mirabile and Maryland Bank were district court deci-
sions and thus are not accorded the same weight as that of Fleet Fac-
tors. While Fleet Factors is not necessarily the "law of the land,"110 it
is binding law in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia as an Eleventh Cir-
cuit decision. Fortunately, other circuit courts have become aware of
the harmful effects of the Fleet Factors decision, and the only circuit
which has interpreted the secured lender exemption after Fleet Fac-
tors has refused to hold lenders broadly liable, even in a factual situa-
105. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
106. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
107. Id at 1558.
108. Id. at 1557-58.
109. The Eleventh Circuit did not decide the entire case, but ruled only on the sum-
mary judgments motions of the government and Fleet, which were controlling ques-
tions of law brought before the court on interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b).
110. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Fleet Factors on January 14, 1991.
Fleet Factors, No. 90-504 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1991). Denial of certiorari was unjustified be-
cause a final interpretation of the secured lender exemption in CERCLA would have
avoided the confusion generated by contradictory legislation, administrative law, and
split application of the federal statute among the circuits.
tion which might have allowed for broad lender liability.111
A. The Facts of United States v. Fleet Factors
Fleet Factors involved Swainsboro Print Works (hereinafter
"Swainsboro"), a cloth printing business, which obtained loans from
the Fleet Factors Corporation (hereinafter "Fleet") in exchange for
the assignment of its accounts receivable.112 To secure the loans,
Fleet obtained a security interest in the Swainsboro facility and in its
equipment, inventory and fixtures. When Swainsboro went bank-
rupt, Fleet foreclosed on the equipment, inventory and fixtures, but
did not foreclose on the facility itself.11s Fleet contracted to have the
foreclosed security sold at auction. After the auction, Fleet con-
tracted to have all of the unsold secured items removed from the fa-
cility.114 After removal of the remaining items, the EPA inspected
the facility, determined that hazardous substances had been dumped
on the premises, and required environmental cleanup.115 The EPA
proceeded to clean the facility at great cost. 116 Title to the facility
was transferred to the county at a foreclosure sale after Swainsboro
failed to pay state and county taxes.1 17 Fleet never foreclosed on the
facility and never obtained legal title to it.11s Empowered by
CERCLA, the United States brought suit against Fleet to recover the
cleanup costs the EPA had incurred.119 Fleet filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, asserting that it was exempt from liability as a mat-
ter of law under the secured lender exemption of CERCLA.120
B. The Rule and Reasoning of Fleet Factors
The Fleet Factors court considered two categories of CERCLA
under which Fleet might be held liable: section 9607(a)(1) 121 as an
"owner and operator" of a facility, and section 9607(a)(2) 12 2 as an
111. See infra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
112. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
113. Id. at 1552-53.
114. Id. at 1553.
115. Id. Fleet prevented Swainsboro from selling certain barrels of toxic waste
which, as a result, remained on the facility. Id. at 1559 n.13.
116. Id. at 1553. The EPA discovered and removed 700 55-gallon toxic chemical
drums and 44 truckloads of substances containing asbestos from the facility. As a re-
sult, the EPA incurred approximately $400,000 in cleanup costs. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The United States also brought suit against Horowitz and Nelson, the two
principal shareholders of Swainsboro Print Works. That action, however, was not rele-
vant to the Fleet Factors "capacity to influence" lender liability rule.
120. Id.
121. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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"owner or operator" of the facility at the time hazardous wastes were
dumped.123
1. Liability as an "Owner and Operator" of the Facility: Section
9607(a)(1)
The court first considered Fleet's liability under CERCLA section
9607(a)(1). 124 The court followed the Maryland Bank holding that
although the term "owners and operators" is phrased in the conjunc-
tive by Congress, the statutory meaning is actually disjunctive.125
The court interpreted an "owner" as the owner of the facility on the
date the suit was filed.126 The owner on the date the suit was filed
was Emanuel County, Georgia. However, SARA amended CERCLA
to exempt units of state and local government which involuntarily
acquire title to property due to tax delinquency.127 Therefore, Eman-
uel County could not be held liable.128 The court noted that when a
unit of state or local government is the title owner of a facility, liabil-
ity statutorily shifts to the person who "owned, operated or otherwise
controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand."129
Since Swainsboro owned the facility immediately before Emanuel
County, Fleet could not be found liable under section 9607(a)(1).
2. Liability as an "Owner or Operator" of the Facility When
Dumping Occurred: Section 9607(a)(2)
After determining that Fleet was not liable as a previous "owner or
operator" of the facility, the court next turned to section 9607(a)(2)
123. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1554-60.
124. Id. at 1554 (citing CERCLA § 107(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 9607(a)(1) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990))).
125. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. Curiously, although each
Court's final determination as to the breadth of lender liability varied from very nar-
row to very broad, the courts in Mirabile, Maryland Bank and Fleet Factors each inter-
preted "owners and operators" in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive.
126. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1554.
127. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499
§ 101, 100 Stat. 1613, 1615 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii)(1988)). SARA ex-
empts units of state and local government from liability if they acquire title involunta-
rily pursuant to their authority as sovereign, such as in situations of tax delinquency as
in the Fleet Factors abandonment and bankruptcy. See supra note 42 and accompany-
ing text.
128. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555.
129. Id. (citing CERCLA § 101(20)(A)(iii) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A)(iii)
(West 1983 & Supp. 1990))). This statutory shift in liability occurs only if the unit of
state or local government has not itself caused the release or threatened release of the
hazardous substance. See supra note 58.
to determine whether Fleet could be held liable as an "owner or op-
erator" of the facility at the time the hazardous substances were
dumped.130 The court noted that the secured lender exemption ex-
cludes from the "owners or operators" definition any "persons who,
without participating in the management of a ... facility holds indicia
of ownership primarily to protect his security interest .... ,,13, The
court determined that although Fleet held indicia of ownership to
protect its security interest, Fleet could still be liable if it had "partic-
ipated" in managing the facility.13 2 The court pointed with disap-
proval to the lower court's reliance upon Mirabile, which stated that
the financial participation of a lender in the management of a facility
is insufficient to hold a lender liable.'33 The circuit court found the
construction of the secured lender exemption in Mirabile "too per-
missive towards secured creditors who are involved with toxic waste
facilities."'134 The court concluded that such an interpretation is
meaningless since it would attach liability only to lenders who partic-
ipated in the operational management of a facility.' 35 The court rea-
soned that if Congress had intended for lenders to be liable only if
they participated in the operational management of a facility, it
would have so stated in CERCLA.136 Because Congress did not state
this explicitly, because the exemption would be meaningless without
a narrow construction, and because the terms "participating in the
management" and "operator" are not "congruent,"'13 7 the court held
that a "secured creditor may incur ... liability, without being an op-
erator, by participating in the financial management of a facility to a
degree indicating a capacity to influence the [borrower's] treatment
of hazardous wastes." 3 8 The court explicitly stated that actual par-
ticipation in management decisions which relate to hazardous wastes
is unnecessary, as long as the capacity to influence the waste prac-
130. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1555-60 (citing CERCLA § 107(a)(2) (codified 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (West 1983 and Supp. 1989))).
131. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555.
132. Id. at 1556. The court also stated that Fleet bore the burden of showing that it
did not participate- in managing the facility. Id. at 1555-56 (citing United States v.
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578 (D. Md. 1986)).
133. Id. at 1557-58.
134. Id. at 1557.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. The court stated that "participation in management" and "operator" are
not "congruent" terms but offered neither an explanation nor a citation to explain its
reasoning. The adjective "congruent" is defined as "in agreement, corresponding; and
harmonious." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 300 (2d ed. 1984).
138. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557 (footnote omitted). 0. Kirby Colson III, Esq., a
corporate attorney, argues that it was not necessary for the Eleventh Circuit to fashion
such a broad rule. Adler, Liberal Rulings Extend Cleanup Liability, Bus. Ins., Oct. 8,
1990, at 27. Mr. Colson stated that "[t]he court simply could have pinned liability by
finding that the bank was an operator of the waste site, since waste site owners and
operators are jointly and severally liable." Id.
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tices of the borrower exists.139
The court used a fair amount of policy to justify its expansion of
lender liability. The court underlined the Maryland Bank court's
concern that allowing only narrow liability for lenders would consti-
tute an "insurance scheme" for lenders.140 Under such a scheme, a
lender who benefitted from governmentally financed cleanup efforts
would own property with a higher market value after cleanup (as
compared to the property's value at the foreclosure sale), but would
be free from liability based on a broad reading of the secured lender
exemption. This "insurance scheme" or windfall for banks141 might
have been entirely legitimate if a lender acquired title to the facility.
But since Fleet never acquired title to the Swainsboro facility, the
court's rationale was misplaced and seems to undermine enforcement
liability against Fleet.
The court addressed the concerns of lenders and stated that "se-
cured creditor[s] can become involved in occasional and discrete fi-
nancial decisions relating to the protection of its security interest
without incurring liability."142 However, the court failed to define
what constitutes either "occasional" or "discrete" financial decisions
which will not give rise to liability. Furthermore, the court failed to
define the requisite "capacity" to influence the dumping practices of
a borrower. 143
139. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558. Edward Brodsky, Esq., (hereinafter Brodsky)
an attorney with the firm of Spenglor, Carlson, Gubar, Brodsky & Frischling, argues
that since Fleet did, in fact, participate in the management of the facility, it could have
been held liable as such. Brodsky, Lender Liability for Environmental Cleanup,
N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1990, at 3. Brodsky states:
Note that the lender in Fleet actually did make certain decisions concerning
the hazardous waste disposal at the facility, and the case could have been de-
cided against the lender on that narrow ground. The court, however, went
further and said that liability could be based on the right to influence rather
than the actual influencing of environmental policy.
Id. (footnote omitted). Indeed, Fleet had prevented Swainsboro from selling certain
toxic chemicals which, as a result, remained on the site. Id at n.4 (citation omitted).
140. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1559 (citing United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust
Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 580 (D. Md. 1986)). See supra note 101.
141. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 580.
142. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
143. Id. This lack of guidance has caused much uncertainty in the lending commu-
nity. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. Indeed, experts in business law
have pointed to the difficulties a lender has in avoiding liability under the Fleet Factors
standard, especially since banks generally are contractually permitted to give instruc-
tions to their borrowers concerning hazardous waste management. Lender Liability
Tightened, Financial Times Ltd., World Insurance Report, July 6, 1990. Joseph H.
Levie, Esq., of the firm Rogers & Wells wrote that the rule that a lender "'can become
involved in occasional and discrete financial decisions relating to the protection of its
Anticipating the negative reaction of lenders to its rule, the court
stated that while its interpretation of the secured lender exemption
"may be challenged as creating disincentives for lenders to extend fi-
nancial assistance to businesses with potential hazardous waste
problems.... [t]hese concerns are unfounded."'1 44 The court adopted
an optimistic stance, reasoning that its holding would "encourage po-
tential creditors to investigate thoroughly the waste treatment sys-
tems and policies of potential debtors."145 In other words, caution
and prudence in the lending practices of banks would effectively
counter the potential for lender liability under CERCLA according to
the Eleventh Circuit. In sum, the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors
held that a lender will be liable for environmental cleanup costs if it
has the capacity to influence the borrower's dumping practices.
V. THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. FLEET FACToRS
Private lenders, businesses, and government financial institutions
have been adversely affected by the broad liability of the Fleet Fac-
tors decision. Although the decision of Maryland Bank made lenders
more liable than they had been under Mirabile, the Fleet Factors' ap-
portionment of lenders' liability is so broad that it has created uncer-
tainty among members of the financial community. 146 In Fleet
Factors, the Eleventh Circuit predicted that the impact of its holding
would not be as negative as some expected, but rather would en-
courage prudence in the lending practices of banks.147 Unfortu-
nately, the optimism of the Eleventh Circuit has proven itself to be
unfounded. The Fleet Factors decision created uncertainty not only
among banks but also among businesses and government financial in-
stitutions. The following subsections discuss the negative impact that
the Fleet Factors decision has had upon 1) private lenders, 2) busi-
ness, and 3) government financial institutions.
security interest without incurring liability' .. is so unsubstantial that it will be cold
comfort." Levie, Environmental Cleanup; Partnership Interests as Collateral,
N.Y.L.J., July 5, 1990, at 5.
144. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
145. Id. Attorney Brodsky argues that the Fleet Factors decision might be counter-
productive in its attempts to encourage lenders to monitor and push for safe disposal
of wastes by borrowers. The monitoring and advice of lenders might themselves be
sufficient "capacity to influence" the dumping practices of a facility, and therefore
might be sufficient to make the lender liable. Brodsky, Lender Liability for Environ-
mental Cleanup, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1990, at 3.
146. Id. Mitchell states that "Fleet Factors has sent shock waves through the bank-
ing industry; an industry that has watched with growing concern as the so-called se-
cured creditor exemption to CERCLA has been progressively narrowed by the federal
courts." Id.
147. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
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A. Impact on Private Lenders
In the wake of Fleet Factors, banks have severely restricted their
loans to businesses. 148 Banks, like all other businesses, operate for
profit. When loans are transformed from sources of profit into
sources of liability, it is unreasonable for banks to continue to lend.
Due to the new standard for liability announced in Fleet Factors, cer-
tain loans which had been sources of honest profit in the past are
now considered by banks to be sources of enormous liability.149 In-
deed, since environmental cleanup costs can easily total two or three
times the value of the property held in security by a lender, banks do
not face merely a loss equivalent to the value of their security inter-
est, but a far more negative loss which cuts into their assets and
money reserves. 150 As a result, banks have slashed the number of
loans they now make compared to those they previously made.151
The banking industry, which has been plagued by financial disasters
such as junk bonds, failed real estate loans, and Third World debt,
now has to add the present disaster of environmental liability to its
list of profit-cutting and capital-reducing difficulties.152
The leet Factors rule holding lenders liable once they possess the
capacity to influence the dumping practices of a borrower is unrea-
sonable in its practical application. A bank holds the borrower's fa-
cility in security in order to insure repayment of the debt via
foreclosure. The secured facility or "security interest" must be kept
valuable if it is to remain an adequate guarantee of repayment. 153 To
148. 136 CONG. REC. E-1023 (April 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. John J. LaFalce).
149. See Jaffe, WHose Mess is This?, FORBES, Feb. 19, 1990, at 43. Workmen's
Bancorp recently released a borrower from $558,000 of principal debt and accrued in-
terest, because Workmen's believed that the loan represented a potential environmen-
tal liability. Id. Workmen's wrote off the debt even though the real estate security
had previously received a "clean bill of health" by an environmental survey. Id.
150. Previously, the principal amount due was the total possible loss on a loan.
Hankin, Home Industry Acting to Curb Hazard Liability, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1988, at
El, col. 1. Because cleanup costs are so high, they can easily surpass the value of the
property which secures the loan. Thus, a lender who is held liable under CERCLA
sometimes faces liability three or four times the value of the property held in security.
For example, the FDIC holds $350 million worth of property for liquidation which re-
quire cleanup under CERCLA. The cleanup costs, however, will be greater than $1
billion. See FDIC, RTC Want More CERCLA Protection in Senate Bill Limiting
CERCLA Exposure, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 140, at A-22 (July 20,
1990).
151. 136 CONG. REC. E.1023 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. John J.
LaFalce (D-NY)).
152. Statement of Craig Gass, senior manager at KPMG Peat Marwick, New York.
See also Jaffe, Whose Mess is This?, FORBES, Feb. 19, 1990, at 43.
153. A recent EPA Draft Rule on the interpretation of the secured lender exemp-
ensure that security interests remain valuable, lenders participate in
the financial management of the facility. However, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's application of the maxim "he who holds the purse strings con-
trols the purse," to the lender liability scenario seems to include the
capacity to influence the dumping practices of a lender as part of fi-
nancial management.I5 4 For example, a bank could require a bor-
rower to modernize the facility in order to make it as competitive as
other facilities, and, therefore, maintain its value. Suppose that any
modernization whatsoever would threaten the release of heavy met-
als on the facility. In such a situation, the lender would be finan-
cially participating in the management of the facility and also
influencing the dumping practices of a lender. Once a bank makes
such a demand, it immediately becomes liable under Fleet Factors be-
cause it has influenced the dumping practices of a lender. However,
Fleet Factors liability comes into play not only when there has been
an actual influence of dumping practices, but also whenever there ex-
ists a mere "capacity" to influence dumping practices. Since a lender
cannot participate in the financial management of a facility without
also possessing the "capacity to influence" dumping practices of a
borrower, the Fleet Factors rule forces banks to give free rein to their
borrowers and to take the risk of security interest devaluation in or-
der to avoid liability.x55
The Fleet Factors rule is also unreasonable because it does not pro-
vide necessary guidelines which inform lenders when they actually
have the capacity to influence the dumping practices of a borrower.
Because of the absence of guidelines in the opinion and interpreta-
tion of broad liability for lenders, lenders have adopted the ultimate
caution: they have ceased making loans to environmentally risky
tion notes that the lender's interest is not the facility itself, but rather the "extent to
which the facility... represents a guarantee for the debtor's unpaid obligation." EPA
Lender Liability under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R., reprinted in 21 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) No. 24,
1163 (Oct. 12, 1990) (to be formally codified upon review of comments).
154. Robert B. Koegel, Esq. (hereinafter Koegel), an attorney of counsel to Ern-
strom & Estes in New York, argues that almost anything can be construed as the ca-
pacity to influence the dumping practices of a facility. Koegel, Bank Power Draws
Superfund Liability, N.Y.L.J., July 9, 1990, at 1. Koegel states: "[a]rguably, every se-
cured creditor has the 'capacity to influence' its debtor's hazardous waste disposal deci-
sions, or any other debtor decision, simply because of its security interest." Id.
Diane Smith, Esq., an environmental attorney with the firm of Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue, states that "merely by checking into the borrower's operations the lender ac-
quires the ability to influence [dumping] operations and is therefore liable .... " Fine,
Appellate Ruling Trims Baules' Cleanup Exemption, ORANGE COUNTY Bus. J., July 16,
1990, at 9.
155. Janet W. Lamkin, a lobbyist for the California Bankers Association, asserts
that banks' supervision of borrowers is essential to protect the banks' security interest.
Lamkin states: "[i]f a bank is uncertain about how a business is running, it needs to
have some oversight" into the debtor's business. A Lending Squeeze on Small Firms,
NATION'S BUSINESS, May 1990, at 52.
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businesses.156 The complete lack of guidelines further exacerbates
the banks' fears by injecting uncertainty into the lending process.'5 7
Fleet Factors would continue to adversely affect banks even if its
opinion provided liability guidelines, simply because of the enormous
breadth of the "capacity to influence" rule. Had the court provided
liability guidelines, however, banks could exercise increased pru-
dence, perhaps avoiding liability altogether. But the lack of guidance
in the Fleet Factors decision forces banks to opt for safety instead of
potential liability. This restricts the availability of credit even fur-
ther as banks refuse to make loans to environmentally risky busi-
nesses.'58 Some banks are so uncertain about the potential for
litigation and so fearful of environmental liability that they simply
write off the outstanding debt owed to them by a liability-prone
debtor.X5 9 Such a practice denies a bank its profit and part of its
working capital.
Small banks are even more adversely affected by a large environ-
mental cleanup bill than are large banks because small banks possess
smaller total assets and comparatively smaller working capital than
do larger lenders. While a large cleanup bill would decrease the total
profits of a large bank, certain banks are so small that a single envi-
ronmental cleanup bill could effectively wipe them out.1 60
B. Impact on Business
Due to the decrease in loans made to businesses after Fleet Factors,
businesses presently suffer from restricted credit availability.161
156. Clyde Mitchell, Esq. (hereinafter Mitchell), a finance and banking law attor-
ney with White & Case, states that "businesses that produce or deal in hazardous
waste will find it increasingly difficult to obtain financing." Mitchell, Liability Under
CERCLA for Indenture Trustees, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23, 1990, at 3.
157. See EPA Lender Liability under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R., reprinted in 21 ENV'T.
REP. No. 24, 1162 (Oct. 12, 1990) (to be formally codified upon review of comments).
158. See FDIC, RTC Want More CERCLA Protection in Senate Bill Limiting
CERCLA Exposure, Daily Reports for Executives (BNA) No. 140, at A-22 (July 20,
1990).
159. See Jaffe, Whose Mess is This?, FORBES, Feb. 19, 1990, at 43.
160. Patrick A. Wick, President of The Bank of Turtle Lake, in Turtle Lake, Wis-
consin, states that "out in the country where we deal with small companies, one [envi-
ronmental cleanup] bill like that would be devastating to us." A Lending Squeeze on
Small Firms, NATION'S BUSINESS, May, 1990, at 52.
161. Representative John J. LaFalce stated that broad lender liability under
CERCLA results in a "squeeze on credit." 136 CONG. REC. E-1023 (daily ed. Apr. 4,
1990) (statement of John J. LaFalce). See also Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No.
140, at A-22 (July 20, 1990) (remarking that lenders will avoid making litigation-prone
loans).
Businesses require constant infusions of capital in order to function
smoothly and profitably. For example, businesses routinely require
loans to purchase inventories, to modernize their facilities, and to fi-
nance their debts. By restricting the availability of loans, therefore,
Fleet Factors has made it difficult for businesses to function
effectively.162
Businesses which are perceived by lenders as high environmental
risks are more affected by the Fleet Factors decision than are "low
risk" businesses. Dry cleaners, gasoline stations, and metal elec-
troplaters are examples of businesses which require storage of chemi-
cals on their premises for use in daily business activities.163 Since
such businesses are commonly known to store chemicals on their
premises, banks often summarily refuse to lend to these
businesses.164
Small and startup businesses are also more negatively impacted by
the restriction of credit than are large businesses. Whereas large
businesses can give bonds, shares of stock and large inventories and
accounts receivable as collateral for loans, real property is often the
only source of collateral with which small and startup businesses can
secure loans.165 Because lender liability under CERCLA often re-
sults from the ownership' 66 or operation of a facility upon which
wastes have been dumped, banks are more likely to reject small and
startup businesses rather than large businesses as potential loan re-
cipients. The consequence of Fleet Factors is unfortunate, since small
and startup businesses create many new jobs and generate capital in
an economy which desperately needs both.
Businesses do not suffer only because of Fleet Factors' restriction
of available capital. Indeed, although banks extend fewer loans to
business, they still extend financing to certain businesses. Banks
view these loan recipients as lower environmental risks. However, to
162. See Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 140, at A-22 (July 20, 1990).
163. Other examples of such businesses include transshipers, wood product manu-
facturers and metal finishers. 136 CONG. REC. E-1023 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990) (state-
ment of John J. LaFalce).
164. John Bowers, Executive Vice President of the Maryland Bankers Association,
states that "[flor some types of businesses, like gasoline stations, dry cleaners or busi-
nesses that involve underground tank storage of chemicals, the risks are high enough
to shut them off from borrowing altogether." Hamilton, Passing the Buck on Toxic
Cleanup; Lenders Increasingly Held Liable for Hazards on Foreclosed Sites, Wash.
Post, July 6, 1990, at Cl, col. 1.
165. Bradley S. Tupi, Esq., an attorney who has represented lenders in previous
lender liability cases, states that the Fleet Factors decision broadens Superfund liability
and will cause a "squeeze on credit for small businesses." He asserts that "[i]f you're a
small business owner and the only thing you have to secure a loan is a piece of prop-
erty, a bank is going to be extremely wary about extending credit." A Lending Squeeze
on Small Firms, NATION'S BUSINESS, May 1990, at 52.
166. The Fleet Factors Corporation was liable but did not own the property. Fleet
Factors, 901 F.2d at 1553.
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determine which businesses are low-risk ventures, banks must make
environmental surveys. 16 7 The costs of these surveys are high and
typically passed on to the loan recipient.'68 In addition to the costs of
environmental surveys, banks attempt to protect themselves by
charging higher loan fees16 9 and "points."170 Although the sum of
these costs hurt larger businesses, they have a greater impact on
small and startup businesses. In fact, to some small businesses, these
costs are prohibitive,171 fully restricting the availability of startup
and operating capital.
C. Impact on Government Financial Institutions
Private lenders and businesses are not the only sectors of the econ-
omy which are adversely affected by the Fleet Factors decision. Gov-
ernment financial institutions have also come within the scope of
Fleet Factors liability.172 The FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corpo-
ration (hereinafter "RTC"), which hold properties for failed lending
institutions prior to liquidation, 173 also face CERCLA cleanup liabil-
167. The opinions in both the Maryland Bank and Fleet Factors decisions en-
couraged lenders to undertake environmental audits of properties before accepting
them as security for loans. These encouragements, however, were made under the as-
sumption that hazardous wastes are identifiable, and that they are present at the time
that the loan is made. Koegel points out that contamination by hazardous substances
is often difficult to detect. Koegel, Bank Power Draws Superfund Liability, N.Y.L.J.,
July 9, 1990, at 1.
168. James P. O'Brien, Esq., an attorney with Chapman & Cutler in Chicago, who
testified at a Superfund liability hearing, stated that the average cost of an environ-
mental audit is approximately $4,500. He also estimated that over $418 million would
be spent on such audits within the next decade. Hamilton, Passing the Buck on
Cleanup; Lenders Increasingly Held Liable for Hazards on Foreclosed Sites, Wash.
Post, July 6, 1990, at C1, col. 1.
169. Some fees commonly charged by lenders are beneficiary and/or trustee fees
for assumptions, modifications, substitutions, extensions, renewals, subordinations,
rescissions, changes of owners, recordation of maps, plat or record of surveys, grants of
easements, and full and partial reconveyance fees. Deed of Trust, Great Western Bank
(California), provision 19. (Copy available at the offices of the Pepperdine Law
Review).
170. A point is a percentage of the principal mortgage debt which is paid to the
lender up front.
171. 136 CONG. REC. E-1023 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. John J.
LaFalce).
172. See generally Labaton, Pollution Raises Cost of Bailout, N.Y. Times, July 20,
1990, at C1, col. 6.
173. When the savings and loan institutions collapsed in the late 1980's, the FDIC
and RTC took over their assets in order to sell them off and satisfy creditors. The
RTC was created by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (hereinafter "FIRREA") in order to facili-
tate the asset liquidation of failed savings and loans institutions. FIRREA is an over-
ity under Fleet Factors. Many of the properties held by the FDIC and
RTC require hazardous waste cleanup.174 Cleanup costs for the
FDIC properties alone would exceed $1 billion, although the proper-
ties themselves are worth only approximately $350 million.'7 5 While
the concept of governmental entities suing one another for the recov-
ery of funds might seem a blatant waste of taxpayer money and an
unproductive use of the judiciary, the repercussions go further than
the simple transfer of funds from one government organ to another.
The General Accounting Office currently estimates that thirty-five
banks will fail within the next year.176 The cost of these bailouts
could exceed $6 billion, which would place the FDIC's insurance fund
in a "paper thin margin" of operation. 17 7 It will be difficult enough
for the FDIC to bail out these thirty-five banks without the added
environmental liability ushered in by Fleet Factors.178
The FDIC and RTC also face the difficulty of selling assets they
whelmingly complex piece of legislation which is over 350 pages long and amends 246
statutes.
174. According to Steven A. Seelig, Director of the FDIC's liquidation division, the
FDIC presently holds 400 properties which require cleanup under CERCLA. Labaton,
supra note 172, at D1, col. 6.
175. Jim Davis, a Senior Asset Specialist for the RTC states that the agency had
found 300 environmentally problematic properties in its list of assets, and expects to
find 200 to 300 more. Id. Davis points out that the cleanup costs for the properties
mentioned would be significant even if only one to two percent of the assets required
cleanup. Id.
176. Rosenblatt, Shaky Banks Could Create 2nd Nightmare, L.A. Times, Sept. 17,
1990, at A12, col. 1. Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States,
blamed bad loans and low real estate prices for the expected bank failures. Id. He
stated, however, that none of the twenty largest American banks were expected to
fold. Id. The FDIC estimates that
in a mild recession 180 banks with total assets of $65 billion will fail this year
and 160 with assets of $30 billion will fail in 1992. If the recession is worse
... 230 banks with assets of $90 billion will fail this year, followed by 210 fail-
ures with assets of $70 billion in 1992.
Bacon, Seidman Says the Bank Insurance Fund Needs Fast Irfusion of up to $10 Bil-
lion, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1991, at A2, col. 2.
177. Rosenblatt, supra note 176, at A12, col. 1. The FDIC insurance fund has al-
ready diminished from $18 billion to $13 billion in the past two years, and FDIC Chair-
man L. William Seidman foresees that the fund will shrink by another $2 billion by
the close of 1991. Because the bailout of the banks which are expected to fold within
the next year could be as high as $6.3 billion, Comptroller General Bowsher believes
that the FDIC insurance fund is only a recession away from being wiped out. Id. at
Al, col. 3. Senator Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (D-MI), chairman of the Senate Committee
on Banking, is even more skeptical, and believes that the FDIC insurance fund might
actually be empty and become bankrupt without the knowledge of regulators. Id. at
A12, col. 1. Senator Riegle states: "[w]e're down to a paper thin margin." Id. On Feb-
ruary 1, 1991, Seidman informed the banking community that the FDIC's bank insur-
ance fund required a "quick infusion of $5 billion to $10 billion." Bacon, supra note
176, at A2, col. 1.
178. Steven A. Seelig, Director of the FDIC's liquidation division comments that
"[t]he greatest risk of such claims is that they may divert deposit insurance funds and
taxpayers' money allocated to resolve the savings and loan crisis from their intended
purpose." Labaton, supra note 176, at D1, col 6.
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hold for liquidation.179 One of the principal functions of the FDIC
and RTC is the liquidation of properties "owned" by failed banks in
order to satisfy the debts of their creditors. Because Fleet Factors
might attach liability to purchasers of the assets held for liquidation
by the FDIC and RTC, many prospective purchasers fear liability
under Fleet Factors and will fail to purchase the properties. Bank
creditors will suffer because of the extended time it will take to sat-
isfy their debts. Asset purchaser liability will hinder the functioning
of both the FDIC and the RTC as both deposit insurers and asset
liquidators.S0
The Small Business Administration (hereinafter "SBA"), a govern-
ment financial institution which makes special government loans to
small businesses, is also a target of the broad liability ushered in by
Fleet Factors.181 In one case, the State of Pennsylvania brought suit
against the SBA because the SBA foreclosed on a wallpaper company
which had contaminated its facility with glue.18 2 Holding the SBA li-
able for cleanup costs harms small businesses in the same way broad
liability for private lending institutions does: it restricts the availabil-
ity of sorely needed credit to small businesses during a time of eco-
nomic illness.18 3
D. Impact on the Environment
While banks, private lenders and government financial institutions
have been adversely affected by the Fleet Factors decision, it might
seem logical to believe that such broad lender liability would benefit
179. Senator Jake Garn (R-UT) has stated that "[tihese looming [environmental] li-
abilities already are affecting the RTC's ability to market failed institutions and their
assets, and they are threatening to sidetrack funds earmarked to resolve the [savings
and loan] crisis." Collins, Washington; Lenders Seek Exemption From Law on
Cleanup of Toxic Wastes, L.A. Times, May 6, 1990, at D2, col. 1.
180. The FDIC and RTC are attempting to strengthen the indemnification lan-
guage in S. 2827, a Senate bill which would partially indemnify lenders from CERCLA
liability (commonly referred to, in part, as the Lender Liability Act of 1990). Finan-
cial Institutions: FDIC, RTC Want More CERCLA Protection in Senate Bill Limiting
CERCLA Exposure, Daily Report for Executives, (BNA) No. 140, at A-22 (July 20,
1990). See infra notes 258-81 and accompanying text.
181. Sally B. Narey, Esq., General Counsel for the SBA, states that broad lender
liability threatens the SBA. A Lending Squeeze on Small Firms, NATION'S BUSINESS,
May 1990 at 52.
182. Id. (statement of Sally B. Narey, Esq., General Counsel for the SBA).
183. Representative LaFalce has stated that Fleet Factors has contributed to a
"credit crunch" and that the SBA has decided against making loans to businesses
which might be environmentally risky. FDIC, RTC Want More CERCLA Protection in
Senate Bill Limiting CERCLA Exposure, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 140,
at A22, (July 20, 1990) (statement of Rep. LaFalce).
the environment by increasing monies available to effectuate clean-
ups of hazardous wastes. Strangely enough, broad lender liability
will not, in the long run, increase such needed environmental
cleanups.
Most people would agree that a clean and healthy environment
must be maintained. To achieve this laudable goal, there must be a
disbursement of funds for cleanup efforts. Under Fleet Factors, three
groups finance environmental cleanup efforts: 1) the EPA, because it
is empowered by CERCLA to do so; 2) the parties who generate,
dump or transport hazardous wastes, because they are at fault; and 3)
lenders, who have deep pockets.'8 4
The central issue in Fleet Factors and CERCLA liability in general
is not how much money will be spent for cleanup, but where the
money will come from. One might logically deduce that the liability
of banks will provide a plentiful source of funds from which to fi-
nance cleanups. Yet, as stated in this Comment, banks are ceasing to
make loans to environmentally risky, liability-prone businesses. 8 5
Although it may take some time before all lenders realize the poten-
tial for environmental liability in their industry, surely lenders will
soon unanimously acknowledge this major problem and restrict loans
to only environmentally low-risk borrowers. In other words, banks
will intentionally sew up their presently deep pockets to prevent
their funds from being touched by Fleet Factors liability. As a result,
the EPA will lose a source of funds with which to finance cleanup
efforts. Because of the liability-avoidance tactics of lenders, instead
of having an increased amount of cleanup funds at its disposal, the
EPA will, in the long run, continue to have the same amount of
funds available as before Fleet Factors. After all, nothing forces lend-
ers to lend money to particularly high-risk debtors. Hence, funding
for cleanup of the environment might only increase for a short pe-
riod, but once banks realize their potential liability, they are likely to
react in unison and restrict loans to avoid liability.
VI. REACTION TO FLEET FACTORS AND BROAD LENDER LIABILITY
A. Reaction to Broad Lender Liability by Other Federal Circuit
Courts after Fleet Factors
Only one circuit court has had the opportunity to interpret the se-
cured lender exemption after the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fleet
Factors. In In re Bergsoe Metal Corporation,8 6 the Ninth Circuit
ruled that a party which held title to an environmentally polluted fa-
184. See supra note 5.
185. See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
186. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
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cility was not liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA because it held
title only to protect its security interest.1 8 7 Unfortunately, since the
party which held title to the facility never managed the facility, the
Ninth Circuit did not have the occasion to decide whether to adopt or
reject the Fleet Factors rule for lenders who participate in the man-
agement of a facility.
1. The Facts of In re Bergsoe Metal
In re Bergsoe Metal involved the Port of St. Helens, Oregon (here-
inafter the "Port"), the Bergsoe Metal Corporation (hereinafter
"Bergsoe") and the United States National Bank of Oregon (herein-
after the "Bank"). The Port, a municipal corporation, sold Bergsoe
50 acres of land to build a lead recycling plant.'8 8 To finance the
purchase, Bergsoe gave the Port a mortgage on the land and a prom-
issory note. To finance the construction of the recycling plant, the
Port issued revenue bondsls9 which the Bank held in trust. The rev-
enue from the sale of the bonds went to Bergsoe who, in turn, was to
pay the money owed on the bonds to the Bank.190 Bergsoe deeded
the land to the Port, and in exchange, the Port gave Bergsoe two
leases: one for the land and one for the recycling facility which Berg-
soe promised to construct.191 The rents for the two leases were to be
paid to the Bank and were equal to the principal and interest on the
bonds. Bergsoe retained the option to repurchase the land after the
obligations on the bonds were fulfilled.192
Bergsoe constructed the lead recycling facility, which soon exper-
ienced financial difficulties. As a result, Bergsoe defaulted on its pay-
ments to the Bank. Bergsoe brought in a third party, Front Street
Management, to take over the management of the facility, in ex-
change for a promise by the Bank not to foreclose.193 This scheme
failed to result in financial success for Bergsoe. The Bank placed
Bergsoe in involuntary bankruptcy after the facility was shut
down.194 By that time, the Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality determined that hazardous wastes present on the site re-
187. Id. at 673.
188. Id. at 669-70.
189. Id. at 670. The Port could therefore be considered a lender within the context
of lender liability.
190. Id.




quired cleanup.195 The Bank and the trustee in bankruptcy sued the
owners of Bergsoe ("EAC") and sought, inter alia, to obtain a decla-
ration that EAC was liable for the cleanup. EAC counterclaimed, al-
leging that both the Port and Bank were liable for the cleanup costs
under CERCLA.196 The Port filed a summary judgment motion al-
leging that since the Port was not an "owner" of the facility under
CERCLA, it was exempt from liability.197 The Ninth Circuit decided
this summary judgment motion in In re Bergsoe Metal.
2. The Ninth Circuit's Reasoning in In re Bergsoe Metal
The Ninth Circuit ruled that merely holding paper title (i.e., the
deed) to the facility was insufficient to make the Port liable as an
"owner" under CERCLA.198 The court determined that the Port
could not be held liable if it were covered by the secured lender ex-
emption, which exempts from liability those "who, without partici-
pating in the management of a ... facility, holds indicia of ownership
primarily to protect [a] security interest .... "199 In order for the
Port to remain exempt from liability by means of the secured lender
exemption, the Port must demonstrate that 1) it held indicia of own-
ership primarily to protect its security interest, and 2) that it did not
"participate" in the management of the facility.200
The court first considered whether the Port held indicia of owner-
ship.201 The court determined that the Port held the deed to the fa-
cility in order to guarantee that Bergsoe would meet its lease
obligations. 202 The guarantee of Bergsoe's obligations under the
leases in turn guaranteed the obligations of the Port under the
bonds.203 Since the Port held title to the facility in order to protect
its ability to pay its indebtedness under the bonds, the court deter-
mined that the Port held the deed to protect a security interest and,
thus, was not liable.204
In ruling this way, the Ninth Circuit seems to have followed










204. Id. at 671-72.
205. Before In re Bergsoe Metal was even decided, Joseph H. Levie, Esq. of Rogers
& Wells wrote that the Fleet Factors decision was "important but we must wait for
further decisions before we can be sure of the trend." Levie, Environmental Cleanup,
Partnership Interests as Collateral, N.Y.L.J., July 5, 1990, at 5. These were words of
wisdom, for a little over a month later, the Ninth Circuit in In Re Bergsoe Metal ruled
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lender who purchases at foreclosure and later resells does so in order
to protect his security interest and does not thereby become liable.206
The reasoning in Mirabile was that a lender can be exempt from lia-
bility even if he holds title to a property, so long as title is held to
protect his security interest.207 Maryland Bank on the other hand
ruled that a party is liable for cleanup as soon as it obtains title to a
facility.208 Under the Maryland Bank rule, therefore, the Port's ac-
tion of holding the deed would create immediate liability. Under
Mirabile, however, since the Port held title to the facility to protect
its security interest, liability would not attach.209 Although the
Ninth Circuit cited neither Mirabile nor Maryland Bank, its reason-
ing appears to parallel Mirabile's and to counter Maryland Bank's.
Although the court decided that the Port could not be held liable
merely by holding title to the facility in order to protect its security
interest, the court noted that the Port could still be liable if it "par-
ticipated" in the management of the facility.2 10 The Port, however,
never participated in the management of the facility in the slightest.
For this reason, and because the Port held title in order to protect its
security interest, the Ninth Circuit found the Port not liable as a
matter of law, and granted the Port's summary judgment motion.21 '
3. The Impact of Bergsoe Metal on Fleet Factors
Because the Port never played a participatory role in the manage-
ment of the facility, the Ninth Circuit did not rule on the validity of
Fleet Factors in the Ninth Circuit. Fleet Factors held that a lender is
liable if it participates in the management of a facility to the extent
that it possesses the capacity to influence the dumping practices of
the borrower. 2' 2 Absent any evidence of participation, the Fleet Fac-
in favor of narrow lender liability. See supra note 186. The fact that the circuit court
in In re Bergsoe Metal tended to follow Mirabile, and consequently adopted a narrow
lender liability standard for the Ninth Circuit, shows that lender liability is not an in-
creasing trend, but rather a split of authority. In the past, the split was between dis-
tricts; today the split is between circuits. Such a split emphasizes the need for the
Supreme Court to rule with finality on the issue of lender liability. See irfra note 221
and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
210. In re Bergsoe Metal, 910 F.2d at 672.
211. I& at 673.
212. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
tors rule cannot be applied.
Although the Ninth Circuit expressly stated that it neither fol-
lowed nor rejected the Fleet Factors rule,213 Bergsoe, nevertheless,
stands for a rule of narrow lender liability due to its implied reliance
on Mirabile and implied rejection of Maryland Bank. The Ninth Cir-
cuit indirectly rejected the Fleet Factors rule, stating that
"[r]egardless of what rights the Port may have had, it cannot have
participated in management if it never exercised them."214 The
Ninth Circuit's language seems to signify that a mere capacity to in-
fluence the borrower's actions is insufficient and that an actual exer-
cise of management is necessary to hold a lender liable.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Bergsoe is important in one other
respect. Commentators perceive the stream of cases involving lender
liability under CERCLA as a continuous trend toward broad liability
for lenders.215 By choosing the path of narrow liability for lenders,
however, the Ninth Circuit has broken this trend, causing a split
among the circuits.
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to the Fleet Factors
Corporation in United States v. Fleet Factors Corporation,2' 6 perhaps
because it half-heartedly agreed with the Fleet Factors rule but, nev-
ertheless, wished to see Congress pass indemnification legislation to
rectify the present breadth of liability. In the opinion of this writer,
the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to Fleet Factors in
order to clarify the issue of CERCLA lender liability, while preserv-
ing the Congress' ability to pass lender indemnity legislation.
B. The EPA's Reaction to the Broad Lender Liability under Fleet
Factors
The EPA itself has opposed the broad lender liability ushered in by
Fleet Factors and has attempted to narrow it by drafting an adminis-
trative rule which interprets the secured lender exemption of
CERCLA.217 The EPA, which some might expect to welcome the
Fleet Factors decision with open arms by virtue of its pro-environ-
ment purpose, does not approve of the broad standard of liability cre-
213. In re Bergsoe Metal, 910 F.2d at 672. The Ninth Circuit stated: "[w]e leave for
another day the establishment of a Ninth Circuit rule on this difficult issue .... Here
there was [no participation], and we therefore need not engage in line drawing." Id.
214. Id. at 673.
215. See Comment, supra note 2; Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability:
Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1987).
216. See Fleet Factors Corp. v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991) (denying petition
for certiorari).
217. EPA Lender Liability under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. reprinted in 21 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) No. 24, 1162 (Oct. 12, 1990) (to be formally codified upon review of comments).
The Rule was drafted on September 14, 1990.
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ated by the Eleventh Circuit.218 The EPA's opposition to Fleet
Factors extends beyond mere congressional testimony, however. The
EPA has drafted an administrative rule219 which specifies how the
secured lender exemption to "owners or operators" in CERCLA
should be interpreted.220
The EPA administrative rule (hereinafter the "Rule") is a dream
come true for lenders, even going so far as to describe the Fleet Fac-
tors' "capacity to influence" rule as dicta.221 The EPA issued the
Rule as a "final interpretative rule" meant to specify "what actions
they may take and still remain within the bounds of... the secured
[lender] exemption .... "222 The Rule reconciles the lenders' needs
to protect their security interest with those of the EPA to clean up
hazardous wastes.22 3 Although the EPA's Rule is favorable to lend-
218. EPA Administrator William K. Reilly testified that the EPA had not intended
for banks "to get stuck with the costs, and we haven't adequately addressed this."
Hamilton, Passing the Buck on Toxic Cleanup; Lenders Increasingly Held Liable for
Hazards on Foreclosed Sites, Wash. Post, July 6, 1990, at C1, col. 1. Reilly also indi-
cated that the EPA and the Department of Justice were attempting to resolve the
lender liability issue. Id The Rule states: "this rule seeks to reconcile the lender's
need to manage loans with EPA's duty to clean up waste sites and recover public funds
spent in remediating these sites." 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1163.
219. The Rule states:
EPA is promulgating this rule as a final interpretative rule which is effective
upon publication in the Federal Register in accordance with the provisions of
section 553(b) and (d) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). These sec-
tions of the APA authorize the Agency to issue interpretative rules without
providing notice and opportunity to comment and to make today's rule imme-
diately effective rather than wait for the expiration of a 30-day period. Be-
cause of the important issues that are raised by this interpretative rule,
however, the Agency is accepting public comment for a sixty-day period.
Upon review of the comments, EPA will formally codify the rule in 40 C.F.R.
Part 0.
EPA: Lender Liability under CERCLA, 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1162. As of the writ-
ing of this Comment, the EPA Rule was still on review at the White House Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB").
220. According to James Strock, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement,
the procedural goal of the Rule is to "hold off legislation pending in the House and
Senate that would tinker with CERCLA's liability language." EPA Says Lenders May
Influence Decisions in Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues, 21 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 1139, 1140 (Oct. 12, 1990).
221. The EPA Rule seems so radically opposed to the Fleet Factors decision that it
considers the "capacity to influence" rule "dicta." 21 ENVT REP. (BNA) at 1162. The
EPA does not explain why it believes the Fleet Factors rule to be dicta. Ostensibly, the
EPA might consider the "capacity to influence" rule as dicta because Fleet could have
been held liable as an operator or an actual participant in the facility and therefore,
the court was not obliged to fashion a new and broad lender liability rule in order to
hold Fleet liable. See supra notes 137-39.
222. 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1162.
223. Id at 1163.
ers, some may argue it does not go far enough. The Rule merely in-
terprets the secured lender exemption already in CERCLA, but does
not modify the actual language of CERCLA. Lenders would prefer
additional federal legislation indemnifying them from CERCLA
cleanup liability altogether. Although doubtlessly the Rule would be
accorded great weight in court and would be binding upon the EPA,
if the language of CERCLA remains unchanged, courts may continue
to differ on the interpretation of the secured lender exemption. 22 4 If
legislation were passed which expressly indemnified lenders from
CERCLA cleanup liability, however, courts would have no choice but
to narrow the scope of liability for lenders.
Nevertheless, the Rule is significant because it originates from the
agency which expends funds and efforts for waste cleanup, yet inter-
prets CERCLA lender liability narrowly. The Rule interprets the
lender exemption to permit a "broad range of lender activity."225
Such an interpretation accomplishes three things: 1) it allows lenders
to foreclose and resell property without being held liable for cleanup
costs; 2) it allows lenders to participate in the financial management
of a facility without incurring liability; and 3) it protects the FDIC
and RTC from liability in their duties as conservators, receivers and
liquidators of ailing and failed banks. The Rule, however, does not
release from liability lenders who caused the release of hazardous
waste.2 26
1. Foreclosure and Resale of Property Held in Security
The EPA's Rule asserts that a lender may obtain title at a foreclo-
sure sale and resell a property held in security while maintaining its
exempt status under CERCLA.227 There are two requirements
which a lender must meet in order to avoid liability in this context.
First, the EPA requires that the "temporary acquisition must be rea-
224. Alan P. Vollman, Esq., a partner at Morrison & Foerster in Washington, D.C.,
argues that while the EPA interprets the secured lender exemption favorably, it can-
not be as definitive on the issue of lender liability as actual legislation. Environment:
Legislation Said Needed to Undo Fleet Factors Lender Liability Decision, Daily Report
for Executives (BNA) No. 177 at A15 (Sept. 12, 1990). Vollman states that "legislation
reform is preferable to the administrative solution proposed by the EPA because 'rule-
making can't change what the statute says.'" Id.
225. 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1163.
226. Id. at 1162. The Rule discusses only the Agency's final interpretation of the
secured lender exemption in CERCLA. The Rule does not mention the liability of
lenders who cause the release or threaten release of hazardous substances. Since lend-
ers who cause the release of hazardous substances are not covered by the secured
lender exemption in CERCLA, and since the EPA Rule makes no specific mention of
such provision, it can be inferred that the EPA did not wish to modify the liability of
lenders who cause the release of hazardous substances.
227. Id. at 1164. This assertion directly counters the rule of Maryland Bank that
once a lender acquires title to the property, it is liable. United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579 (D. Md. 1986).
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sonably necessary to ensure satisfaction or performance of'the loan
obligation."2 28 The Rule shifts the burden of proof based on the
length of time the lender holds the property. The Rule presumes
that a lender who keeps property for six months or less prior to re-
sale holds it for the purpose of protecting a security interest.229 How-
ever, if a lender holds property for more than six months, the lender
must show that it holds the property merely to protect a security in-
terest. 23 0 The second requirement mandates disposal of the fore-
closed property "as expeditiously as possible." 23 ' Evidence of the
lender's attempts to expedite disposal of assets includes advertising,
auctioning, and listing the property for sale with a sales agent.232
The Rule addresses the policy concerns voiced in Maryland Bank
and Fleet Factors that banks obtain a windfall from governmental
cleanup costs which leave properties with a higher market value.233
The Rule provides for "equitable reimbursement . . . of the amount
by which the lender has been enriched or has benefitted as a result of
the EPA cleanup."234 Thus, if the facility owned by a lender in-
creases in value due to governmentally financed cleanup efforts, the
lender will be liable for the amount of the increase.
2. Participation in the Financial Management of the Facility
Under the EPA's Rule, the participation of a lender in the finan-
cial management of a facility in order protect the security interest is
in itself insufficient to make a lender liable.235 The Rule dictates
that in order for a lender to become liable, he must participate in the
operational management of the facility.2 3 6 As a direct counter to the
Fleet Factors rule that a lender may be held liable if he has the ca-
pacity to influence the waste dumping practices of the business,237
the EPA's Rule asserts that " '[p]articipation in the management' suf-
ficient to void the [secured lender] exemption ... does not include
228. 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1164. This is synonymous with the requirement that
the lender must hold indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1165.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
234. 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1165. S. 2827 in the Senate would also accomplish this
purpose. See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
235. 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1164-65.
236. Id. at 1164.
237. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) cert
denied. 111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
the mere capacity or ability to influence facility operations."238 The
Rule's interpretation of the secured lender exemption reaffirms the
Mirabile rule - financial management is insufficient to make a
lender liable - only participation in the operational management of
a facility may result in lender liability.239 Thus, under the Rule, a
lender has not sufficiently participated in the management of a facil-
ity unless he has "divested the borrower of decision-making control
over facility operations, particularly with respect to the hazardous
substance present at the facility."240
3. Exemption of FDIC and RTC from Lender Liability when
Action is under FIRREA
As noted in this Comment, uncertainties have arisen concerning
the liability of the FDIC and RTC acting as receivers and conserva-
tors of failed lending institutions. 241 The EPA's Rule greatly limits
the liability of the FDIC and RTC under CERCLA. First, the Rule
interprets ownership of property for liquidation by the FDIC and
RTC as part of the "involuntary acquisition" defense of CERCLA.242
Second, the Rule suggests that the third party or "innocent land-
owner" defense might be available to the FDIC and RTC as an addi-
tional bar to liability, provided that the other requirements of the
defense are met.243
After the EPA reviewed interagency comments on the Rule, the
Agency issued a "revised rule" on January 24, 1991.244 Although the
revised rule still embodies the statements made in the original Rule,
certain important changes have been made. Procedurally, the revised
rule is no longer a "final interpretative rule," but rather a "legislative
rule."245 This is an important procedural modification because, while
a legislative rule allows public comment, an interpretative rule does
not.246
238. Id, at 1165.
239. United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 3-4 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(WESTLAW, WL 97).
240. Id
241. That is, governmental entities such as the FDIC and RTC acting under the
scope of their powers pursuant to the Federal Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat 183. See supra note
177.
242. 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1166 (construing CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(iii), 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(D) (West Supp. 1990)).
243. Id. at 1165-66 (construing CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(b) (West
1983)).
244. See 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1908 (Feb. 22, 1991) (letter from EPA to Office of
Management and Budget) and 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1909-22 (Feb 22, 1991) (text of re-
vised rule).
245. See Real Estate Finance Today, Feb. 18, 1991, at 3.
246. Id. Margaret V. Hathaway, director of commercial real estate finance at the
Mortgage Bankers Association of America (hereinafter Hathaway), states that because
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Second, while the prior Rule established a presumption of nonlia-
bility in favor of a lender if it had undertaken an environmental sur-
vey before granting a loan, the revised Rule eliminates that
presumption.247 Although the EPA continues to attach the status of
probative evidence to environmental surveys, the agency made it
clear in its revised rule that such surveys are neither required, nor do
they constitute evidence that a lender has participated in
management.248
Third, in the original draft of the Rule, the EPA named the FDIC
and the RTC as government financial organizations which could be
held liable for acquisitions of polluted inactive sites in their function
as conservators and receivers for failed lending institutions.249 The
revised Rule dispensed with the names of government financial insti-
tutions, instead shifting to a nonexclusive indemnification of govern-
ment institutions in general.25 0 Consequently, any governmental
institution which acquires property involuntarily in response to its
statutory duties as conservator or receiver will be considered free
from liability.251
Fourth, the revised Rule grants a "safe harbor" to lenders. The re-
vised rule allows lenders to refuse foreclosure and walk away from
security interests without incurring liability.252 The original Rule at-
tached liability onto lenders who either did not foreclose or delayed
foreclosure, thus giving no opportunity for lenders to escape liability.
Although lenders are generally pleased with the revised Rule,
some believe that the revised provisions are insufficient. 253 For ex-
ample, the revised Rule still requires that private lenders liquidate
polluted facilities within six months after foreclosure in order to
show that they have acted expeditiously in selling off their security
interests. After six months, however, the burden of proof shifts back
to the lender who must prove that he acted expeditiously. Some
lenders have noted that it is unreasonable to assume that a lender
the prior rule was an interpretative rule, it "would not have given the public and the
commercial real estate industry any opportunity to comment before the rule became
effective." Id&
247. 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1908 (Feb. 22, 1991). The EPA eliminated the presump-
tion after research and concluded that it was "not workable." Id.
248. Id,
249. See 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1166.
250. 21 ENV'T REP. (BNA) at 1908 (Feb. 22, 1991).
251. I.
252. Real Estate Finance Today, Feb. 18, 1991, at 3.
253. Id. Hathaway believes that "the new EPA draft still has many provisions that
should cause the industry concern." Id.
can, in today's economic climate, successfully sell a polluted facility
within six months.254
VII. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO PARTIALLY INDEMNIFY LENDERS
FROM LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
At present, the House of Representatives and the Senate are each
considering legislation that would severely limit the liability of lend-
ers under CERCLA. The legislation has received wide bipartisan cos-
ponsorship. 255 The two bills differ on one major point. Whereas the
Senate bill would indemnify both private lenders and government fi-
nancial institutions,256 the House bill seems to focus solely on the in-
demnification of private lenders.257 For this reason, while some
government financial institutions prefer the Senate bill, others prefer
the House version, believing that the Senate bill is too all-encompass-
ing and would therefore receive narrow judicial interpretation.258
A. Legislation in the United States House of Representatives
To counter the recent tide of broad lender liability under
CERCLA, Representative John J. LaFalce,259 Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Small Business, introduced House Report 4494 (hereinafter
"H.R. 4494") on April 4, 1990.260 The purpose of H.R. 4494 is to ex-
pand CERCLA's definition of "owners or operators" to explicitly ex-
empt lenders from liability if they "acquire... ownership or control
254. Id. Hathaway states: "It is difficult to dispose of even a clean property in to-
day's market within a six-month period, much less a property that may bear the
stigma of past contamination and the threat of liability for clean-up costs." Id. at 3, 14.
Hathaway additionally believes that it is unfair for the EPA to impose a six-month
limit on the private lender presumption without imposing a similar limit on govern-
ment financial institutions. Id. at 14.
255. The two pieces of legislation are S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) in the
Senate, and H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) in the House of Representatives.
The United States' banking community is undertaking intensive lobbying efforts to en-
sure passage of lender indemnification legislation. EPA to Define Lender Liability,
The Financial Times, World Ins. Rep., August 31, 1990.
256. S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
257. H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. E-1024
(Apr. 4, 1990).
258. See Financial Institutions: FDIC, RTC Want More CERCLA Protection in
Senate Bill Limiting CERCLA Exposure, Daily Report for Executives (BNA) No. 140,
at A-22 (July 20, 1990).
259. United States Representative John J. LaFalce is a Democrat who represents
the population of the 32d Congressional District in the State of New York. He was
first elected in 1974.
260. 136 CONG. REC. E-1023-24 (daily ed. April 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. John J.
LaFalce). Rep. LaFalce introduced H.R. 4494 one month before Fleet Factors was de-
cided. Once Fleet Factors was decided, he redoubled his criticisms of broad liability for
lenders under the new rule. Id. LaFalce stated: "This has turned into the shotgun
theory - sue everyone in sight." Financial Institutions: FDIC, RTC Want More
CERCLA Protection in Senate Bill Limiting CERCLA Exposure, supra note 258, at A-
22.
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of the facility pursuant to the terms of a security interest .... ,,261
The bill would also exempt lenders from liability if they acquired
ownership pursuant to a lease agreement or while serving as inden-
tured trustees for outstanding debt securities.2 62 H.R. 4494, however,
would indemnify only those lenders whose loans were secured by
real property.2 6 3 Since the FDIC and RTC rarely make loans secured
by real property, therefore, H.R. 4494 probably would only protect
private lending institutions and the SBA, not the FDIC or the
RTC.264
It is important to note that while H.R. 4494 would widely eliminate
lender liability under CERCLA, lenders that cause the release or
threatened release of hazardous wastes would remain liable.265 This
reinforces the underlying scheme of CERCLA that cleanup liability
should attach to those who are responsible for dumping hazardous
wastes.
It is ironic that the Eleventh Circuit decided Fleet Factors after
H.R. 4494 had already been introduced in the House of Representa-
tives and received wide cosponsorship. The court based part of its de-
cision on the belief that Congress would have expressly indemnified
lenders who participated in the financial management of a facility
261. See 136 CONG. REC. E-1024 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990).
262. Amending the definition of "owners and operators," H.R. 4494 excludes the
following:
(i) Any designated lending institution which acquires ownership or control of
the facility pursuant to the terms of a security interest held by the person in
that facility ....
(iii) Any individual or institution or successor thereto that serves as an inden-
ture trustee for outstanding debt securities or any certificates of interest or
participation in any such debt securities and acquires ownership or control of
a facility as a result of an event of default pursuant to the terms of an inden-
ture agreement or similar financing document between such trustee and the
issuing entity ....
(v) Any designated lending institution which acquires ownership of any facil-
ity in connection with a lease subject to regulation by applicable federal or
state banking authorities.
H.R. 4494, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. E-1024 (April 4,
1990).
263. Id.
264. Financial Institutions: FDIC, RTC Want More CERCLA Protection in Senate
Bill Limiting CERCLA Exposure, supra note 258, at A-22 (statement of Steven A. See-
lig, Director of FDIC's liquidation division).
265. Rep. LaFalce has stated that "if H.R. 4494 is enacted, a lender would still be
liable if it caused or contributed to hazardous waste contamination, or if it became in-
volved in management of the borrower's facility." Letter from Rep. LaFalce to mem-
bers of Congress (August 3, 1990) (copy on file at the offices of the Pepperdine Law
Review).
had Congress so intended.266 At the same time that the court crafted
this rationale, H.R. 4494 had already gathered many cosponsors.
Thus, either the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit as to congressional
intent was erroneous, or Congress has, in the ten years since the pas-
sage of CERCLA, diametrically changed its intent as to the liability
of lenders who participate in the financial management of a facility.
B. Legislation in the United States Senate
After Representative LaFalce introduced H.R. 4494 in the House,
Senator Edwin Jacob "Jake" Garn, ranking minority member of the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs introduced a
similar piece of legislation known as S. 2827267 on June 28, 1990.268 S.
2827 would indemnify both private lenders and government financial
institutions. The purpose of S. 2827 is to "improve the administration
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and to make technical
amendments to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act."269 Part of S.
2827 is the Lender Liability Act of 1990, which would indemnify lend-
ers from the liability of environmental cleanup costs.270 Whereas
H.R. 4494 would indemnify only private lenders, thereby excluding
government financial institutions, 271 S. 2827 explicitly indemnifies
both governmental financial institutions and private lenders.272 S.
2827 would indemnify an "insured depository institution or mortgage
lender" against liability for the "release, threatened release, storage
or disposal of a hazardous substance.., from property" which is "(1)
acquired through foreclosure; ... (2) held in a fiduciary capacity; or
(3) held, controlled or managed pursuant to the terms of an exten-
sion of credit."273
266. U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 752 (1991).
267. S. 2827, 101st. Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
268. United States Senator Jake Garn is a Republican who represents the State of
Utah. He was first elected in 1974.
269. S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. *1 (1990).
270. S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. *8-12 (1990).
271. Financial Institutions: FDIC, RTC Want More CERCLA Protection in Senate
Bill Limiting CERCLA Exposure, supra note 258, at A-22 (statement of Steven A. See-
lig, FDIC).
272. S. 2827, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. *9 (1990). S. 2827 would also indemnify "the board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and any Federal Reserve Bank, the Fed-
eral Housing Finance Board and any Federal Home Loan Bank, the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the National Credit Union Administration,
... [and] the Farm Credit Administration." Id. at *10.
273. Id. S. 2827 defines "property acquired through foreclosure" as:
Property acquired by a depository institution or mortgage lender -
(A) through purchase at sales under judgment or decree, power of sale, or
from a trustee, if such property was security for an extension of credit previ-
ously contracted; or (B) through conveyance pursuant to an extension of
credit previously contracted.
Id,
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Like H.R. 4494, S. 2827 would not uniformly exempt lenders from
liability. Lenders remain liable if they: 1) have "caused the release or
threatened release" of hazardous waste; 2) had "actual knowledge"
that hazardous waste was stored on the property and failed to take
reasonable actions to prevent the release or threatened release; or 3)
have benefited from the cleanup of the waste.274 Thus, under S. 2827,
a private lender who has benefited from the cleanup of waste from
the property will be liable for the increase in value of the property
from which he has benefited.275
S. 2827 would indemnify government financial agencies27 6 against
liability for:
the release, threatened release, use, storage, or disposal of hazardous sub-
stance ... from property acquired - (1) in connection with the exercise of
receivership or conservatorship authority or the liquidation or winding up of
the affairs of an insured depository institution; (2) in connection with the pro-
vision of loans .. .; (3) ... in connection with any criminal, enforcement, or
other civil proceeding, whether by settlement [or] order. 27 7
Under S. 2827, government financial institutions would nevertheless
be liable if they "caused the release" or had "actual knowledge" that
the property contained waste but "failed to take all reasonable ac-
tions necessary to prevent the release of such substance." 278 Further-
more, S. 2827 requires that governmental financial institutions "take
necessary actions to assure that depository institutions develop and
implement adequate procedures to evaluate potential environmental
risks that may arise from or at property or operations subject to their
lending and fiduciary activities." 2 79
The broad language of S. 2827 has troubled certain members of the
financial community. These individuals believe that the wide
breadth of S. 2827 might encourage narrow judicial interpretation of
the indemnification language.280 Nevertheless, while the financial
274. S. 2827 provides:
The exemptions provided.., shall not apply to any person -
(1) that has caused the release
(2) with actual knowledge that a hazardous substance or similar material is
used, stored, or located on property ... ; or
(3) that has benefitted from removal, remedial or other response action, but
only to the extent of the actual benefit conferred by such action on that
person.
Id, at *10.
275. See supra notes 153-56 and 255-58 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
277. S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. *10-11 (1990).
278. Id. at *11.
279. Id. at *11-12.
280. Financial Institutions: FDIC, RTC Want More CERCLA Protection in Senate
community approves of both the House and Senate bills, financial in-
stitutions prefer S. 2827 because the Senate bill explicitly covers
these government institutions as well as private lenders.
The introduction of H.R. 4494 and S. 2827, as well as the fact that a
majority of Congress supports such legislation,28 should clarify the
intent of Congress with respect to lender liability for environmental
cleanup costs. Even if the language agreed upon by a House and Sen-
ate conference committee is not as strong as that in the current Sen-
ate bill, the final version of the legislation may force the courts to
recognize banks as exempt entities under CERCLA.
VIII. CONCLUSION
By ruling that lenders are liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA
if they possess the capacity to influence the dumping practices of bor-
rowers, Fleet Factors has expanded the breadth of CERCLA lender
liability to an unprecedented level. The Fleet Factors decision has ad-
versely affected banks, businesses and government financial entities
such as the FDIC and RTC.282 Stricken with fear, banks have se-
verely limited the availability of credit to businesses, both large and
small. The restriction of available capital to small and large busi-
Bill Limiting CERCLA Exposure, supra note 258, at A-22 (statement of Steven A. See-
lig, Director of FDIC's Liquidation Division).
281. As of the writing of this Comment, H.R. 4494 has received 290 bipartisan cos-
ponsors, whereas S. 2827 has received only one cosponsor: Senator Nancy Kassebaum
(R-KS). Telephone interview with staff member of the Republican Policy Study Com-
mittee (Nov. 21, 1990). Presumably, the dearth of cosponsors for S. 2827 is due to the
fact that only part of S. 2827 deals with CERCLA lender liability. Most of S. 2827
deals with FDIC reform. Thus, a Senator willing to cosponsor the lender liability pro-
visions of S. 2827 without cosponsoring the FDIC reform provisions would be unable to
do so. This explanation seems to be even more likely when cosponsorship of S. 2827 is
compared to H.R. 4494. Although the indemnification language of S. 2827 is stronger
than the language in H.R. 4494, there should nevertheless be a percentage of the Sen-
ate comparable to that in the House, adjusted for the stronger language of S. 2827. Re-
gardless of S. 2827 cosponsorship, however, 290 cosponsors seems a sufficiently strong
majority in the House to effectuate passage in that chamber. The Senate would proba-
bly follow, perhaps by the introduction of lender indemnification legislation as a sepa-
rate bill.
282. The Southern Finance Project ("SFP"), a liberal research group in Charlotte,
North Carolina, has criticized the strong position of lenders against broad lender liabil-
ity. Collins, Washington/Catherine Collins; Lenders Disputed on Contention that
Cleanup Laws Will Ruin Industries, L.A. Times, October 7, 1990, at D2, col. 1. The
SFP researched EPA files, which identified 17,095 parties as "potentially responsible"
for CERCLA cleanup costs, and ascertained that only forty out of the 17,095 named
parties were lenders. Id. The SFP also noted that by October, 1990, only seven lenders
had paid cleanup costs, totalling $653,000. Id. The fatal flaw in the SFP's reasoning is
that, although lenders have perhaps not yet overwhelmingly been held liable for
cleanup costs, the Fleet Factors decision makes the fear and uncertainty of lenders en-
tirely legitimate since Fleet Factors makes broad lender liability the law in three
states. While "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself," as Franklin Delano
Roosevelt so aptly stated, lenders have something quite real to fear: the law. ROBERT
ANDREWS, THE CONCISE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 96 (1987).
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nesses283 is an undesirable result of broad lender liability. Businesses
have suffered from this dearth of available credit. Finally, the FDIC
and RTC have each suffered from broad lender liability due to the
depletion of the depositor insurance fund and the inability to sell the
assets of failed banks they hold for liquidation, respectively. Courts
should not foster such broad liability, as it curtails economic growth
at a time when growth is essential to overcome America's economic
ills.
The EPA administrative Rule, H.R. 4494 and S. 2827 rectify the
broad lender liability dilemma recently exacerbated by Fleet Factors.
However, the end of broad lender liability will not, in itself, cure the
continuing problem of environmental pollution. Concern for the en-
vironment has mounted dramatically within the past few years. Nev-
ertheless, the question remains: who should be liable for cleanup
costs? Of course, when the party responsible for waste dumping is
solvent, the answer to this question is self-evident: the party respon-
sible for the waste will reimburse the government for cleanup costs
pursuant to CERCLA. This is logically fair. When the responsible
party is insolvent or bankrupt, however, the problem becomes a
political issue. The question then becomes: who should be liable, the
taxpayer or a deep-pocket target who is not responsible for the
waste?
This question may not have an answer. In the opinion of this
writer, the present Superfund should be replaced by a fund created
in the image of the original superfund idea.284 The idea of the
Superfund was originated by oil companies. 285 Beset by cleanup costs
for oil spills, the companies were willing to contribute a certain sum
to a fund which would be used to pay for cleanup expenses.28 6 In ex-
change for their contributions, the oil companies wished to be ex-
empt from liability.28 7 The idea never came to fruition. Such an
apportionment of liability, however, might be the correct path to fol-
low with the Superfund. Perhaps industries which cause waste
should be forced to contribute, based on need, a market share
amount to a fund which would be drawn upon in the event that the
283. Charles M. Mischow, regional president of Marine Midland Bank in Buffalo,
New York, testified that "increased lender liability under CERCLA will affect not
only lenders, but other sectors of the economy, such as businesses, farmers, and home-
owners." Banking Report (BNA) 133 (July 23, 1990).
284. See supra note 33.
285. BNA U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 14 (1988).
286. Id.
287. Id.
party responsible for waste is insolvent. The current strict liability
scheme would no longer be necessary and companies that currently
pollute would inevitably be pressured into environmental compliance
by their companions in the fund. The present-day Superfund follows
a scheme along these lines, but apportions contributions from excise
taxes, mainly on petroleum and chemical feedstocks, and from taxes
on corporations with annual incomes in excess of $2 million. 28 8 Such
a scheme would ease legal uncertainty and judicial delay. Most im-
portantly, however, such a scheme would be fair: it would apportion
liability according to fault either directly, through suits against re-
sponsible parties that can afford cleanup costs, or indirectly, through
contribution from industries which pollute as a matter of fact.
NIcoLAs M. KUBLICKI
288. See supra note 34.
